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ABSTRACT
Why are some countries more effective than others at controlling rhino poaching?
Rhinos are being poached to extinction throughout much of the world, yet some weak
and poor countries have successfully controlled rhino poaching. This dissertation presents
a theory accounting for divergent patterns in the control of rhino poaching, explaining
why rhino poaching has been controlled in some countries yet increases exponentially in
others. It does so by examining the relational models predominant in each country with
wild rhino populations, including institutional analysis of all rhino range states, detailed
analysis of social constructions used by nearly two hundred conservationists in Nepal,
Swaziland, and South Africa, and an analytic narrative exploring why Nepal effectively
controlled poaching. This dissertation shows that when individuals relate to rhinos in a
non-economic manner, rhino poaching can be controlled despite weak police capacity
and huge profit incentives to participate in poaching. This dissertation thus demonstrates
how constructing wildlife with non-economic social dimensions can enable even a weak
and poor country to successful conserve highly endangered species.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation, and the graduate studies it reflects, occurred because of the
counsel and mentorship of my advisor, Deborah Avant. She took risks on me since I
first applied to grad school, and I am deeply grateful for her advice and example. She
and her colleagues at the University of Denver welcomed me to a space where I could
engage with significant puzzles in global governance and the environment. Many in that
community of practice kindly influenced this work, including Rachel Epstein, Martin
Rhodes, Dale Rothman, Mariano Torcal, Suisheng Zhao, Alan Gilbert, Jack Donnelly,
Tim Sisk, Erica Chenoweth, Karin Wedig, and classmates like Callum Forster, Albin
Sikora, Graham Miller, and Steve Hedden. Others at the Korbel School and Sié Center
instrumentally facilitated my studies, including Brad Miller, Susan Rivera, and Jill
Schmieder Hereau. My committee members bridged the roles of teachers and facilitators
by personally inspiring and supporting this project: members Frank Laird, Cullen
Hendrix, Oliver Kaplan, and chair Annecoos Wiersema.
Ideational and material generosity critically enabled this research.
Representatively magnanimous were conservationists and U.S. Government colleagues in
the U.S., South Africa, Swaziland, and Nepal, including Dave Johnson, Denver Zoo; Tim
Wittig, Wildlife Conservation Society; Peik Andersen; Wendell and Tanya Berry; the
Explorers Club, especially Laurie Marker; and West Point’s Department of Social
Sciences, including Jay Parker, Rob Gordon, Cindy Jebb, Suzanne Nielsen, Scott
Silverstone, Tania Chacho, Scott Handler, Heidi and Jeff Demarest, Jeff Bonheim, and
Ryan Boeka.
Finally, the Falenczykowski and Tanghe families spark this all.
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
The Puzzle........................................................................................................................... 4
The Argument ................................................................................................................... 10
The Evidence .................................................................................................................... 13
Why Study Rhinos? .......................................................................................................... 16
Policy Implications ........................................................................................................... 19
Plan of the Dissertation ..................................................................................................... 20
Chapter Two: A Social Theory of Controlling Poaching ................................................. 22
Major Approaches to Understanding Wildlife Policy and Conservation ......................... 23
How Relational Models Can Explain the Control of Poaching ........................................ 37
A Social Theory of Poaching ............................................................................................ 49
Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 52
Research Design................................................................................................................ 53
Chapter Three: Relational Models and the Control of Poaching ...................................... 56
Assumptions...................................................................................................................... 58
Outcome Variable: The Control of Rhino Poaching......................................................... 60
Explanatory Variable: Relational Models ......................................................................... 61
General Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 64
Institutional Rules as Proxy Measures .............................................................................. 64
Causal Mechanisms .......................................................................................................... 67
Data ................................................................................................................................... 69
Results and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 70
Control of Poaching .......................................................................................................... 70
Relational Model ............................................................................................................... 73
State Capacity and Tourism .............................................................................................. 75
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 77
Chapter Four: Manifestations of Controlling Poaching .................................................... 80
Manifestations of Relational Models ................................................................................ 82
Authority Ranking: Relationships Based on Authoritative Hierarchy ............................. 84
Market Pricing: Relationships Based on Ratios................................................................ 86
Research Design................................................................................................................ 88
Results ............................................................................................................................... 93
Nepal: Manifestations of Communal Sharing................................................................... 94
Swaziland: Manifestations of Authority Ranking............................................................. 98
South Africa: Manifestations of Market Pricing............................................................. 101
Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 103
Chapter Five: Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching................................. 106
Modeling Rhino Poaching .............................................................................................. 108
Equilibrium Outcome 1: Market Pricing Relational Model ........................................... 119
iv

Equilibrium Outcome 2: Non-Market Pricing Relational ............................................... 121
Observable Implications of Equilibrium Outcomes ....................................................... 122
Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching ....................................................... 125
History............................................................................................................................. 126
Nepal's Response to the Epidemic .................................................................................. 133
Analysis........................................................................................................................... 143
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 148
Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................................. 152
Literature Explaining Conservation Outcomes ............................................................... 152
Findings........................................................................................................................... 156
The Control of Rhino Poaching ...................................................................................... 156
Relational Models and the Control of Poaching ............................................................. 157
Manifestations of Relational Models in Individual ........................................................ 157
Moral Mechanisms in Nepal’s Control of Poaching....................................................... 158
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 158
Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 159
Theoretical Implications ................................................................................................. 163
Relational Models theory and Sacred Value Protection ................................................. 163
Social-Ecological Systems Framework .......................................................................... 164
An Institutional Sequence for Endangered Species Protection? ..................................... 164
The Price of Rhino Horn and the Evolution of Relational Models................................. 166
Policy Implications ......................................................................................................... 168
References ....................................................................................................................... 173
APPENDIX: Interview Questionnaire ............................................................................ 189

v

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Price per kilogram of Rhino Horn, 1950-2015............................................... 19
Figure 2.1: Social-Ecological Systems Model .................................................................. 34
Figure 2.2: Major Approaches to Explaining Poaching.................................................... 37
Figure 2.3: Causal Relationships ...................................................................................... 51
Figure 4.1: Manifestations of Relational Models, by Country ......................................... 94
Figure 5.1. Levels of Organized Crime in Rhino Poaching............................................ 114

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Control of Rhino Poaching 2006-2015 .............................................................. 8
Table 1.2. State Capacity, Measured by Government Revenue in 2005 ............................ 8
Table 1.3: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Visitors in 2005.......................... 9
Table 1.4: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Receipts in 2005 ........................ 9
Table 2.1: Relational Models ............................................................................................ 42
Table 2.2: Relational Models and Associated Values ...................................................... 44
Table 2.3: Forms of Trade-Off Reasoning ........................................................................ 49
Table 3.1: Proxy Variables for Relational Models ........................................................... 66
Table 3.2: Rhino Poached Per Country, 2006- 2015 ........................................................ 72
Table 3.3: Relational Models and the Control of Poaching .............................................. 75

vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
When Rhino Are Sacred
In 2007, the future of wild rhinoceros in Nepal looked bleak. In the previous
seven years, Nepal lost over 30 percent of its rhinos to poaching. 1 One of the world’s
leading experts on rhinos flatly stated, “Nepal probably had the worst rhino poaching of
any country in the world.” 2 In May 2006, the BBC reported that poaching “continues to
sound alarm bells at the Royal Chitwan National Park,” and in New Delhi, headlines
announced, “Poaching pushing Asian rhino in Nepal towards extinction.” 3
Yet by 2015, Nepal had essentially halted rhino poaching. In 2007, the Nepalese
government initiated Operation Unicornis to foster political commitment and strengthen
counter-poaching across Nepal. 4 In 2010, Nepal’s Prime Minister elevated the issue by
creating a ministerial-level inter-agency task force. 5 These efforts succeeded. For three

1

Esmond Martin, Chryssee Martin and Lucy Vigne, "Recent Political Disturbances in Nepal Threaten
Rhinos: Lessons to be Learned," Pachyderm 45 (2008), p. 99.

2

Esmond Bradley Martin and Chryssee Martin, "Insurgency and Poverty: Recipe for Rhino Poaching in
Nepal," Pachyderm, no. 41 (2006), p. 61.

3

"Rhino Poaching Up in Nepal National Park." BBC Monitoring International Reports, May 7, 2006.;
"Poaching Pushing Asian Rhino in Nepal Towards Extinction." The Hindustan Times, January 4, 2007.
4

Kachan Thapa et al., "Past, Present and Future Conservation of the Greater One-Horned Rhinoceros
Rhinoceros Unicornis in Nepal," Oryx 47, no. 3 (2013), 345-351.
5

"Nepal Orders Investigation into Slaughter of Rhinos." The Telegraph, June 15, 2010.
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separate 12-month periods since 2011, no rhinos were poached. 6 Today, Nepal is the
world’s leader in successful rhino conservation and the control of rhino poaching.
Across the Indian Ocean, conservationists in Swaziland had reason to worry as a
global crisis in rhino poaching erupted in 2007. Swaziland has historically struggled with
rhino conservation. Rhinos were poached to extinction in Swaziland prior to their
reintroduction in the 1965. 7 A second wave of poaching decimated Swazi rhinos from
November 1988 to December 1992. Swaziland’s rhinos were nearly poached to
extinction, at times losing one rhino every two weeks, including up to three per day. 8
Beyond this troubled conservation record, Swaziland is geographically vulnerable
to poaching. Nestled between South Africa and Mozambique, the entire country lies
within 200 kilometers of the poaching crisis’ epicenter in Kruger National Park, a
protected area larger than Swaziland itself. The 2011 poaching of two Swazi rhinos
demonstrates that poaching remains possible. 9 Yet just outside Kruger’s southern
entrance and South Africa’s Intensive Protection Zone, where two rhinos are killed every
day, Swaziland has effectively controlled rhino poaching. Beyond the two rhinos lost in
2011, no rhinos have been poached in Swaziland since the crisis began. 10

6

Ishwar Rauniyar, "Nepal's Rhino Numbers Rise Steadily Thanks to Anti-Poaching Measures," The
Guardian, May 16, 2015.
7

Scott Ramsay, "Swaziland: Showing Africa how to Save Rhinos," African Geographic, April 30, 2014, .

8

Ted Reilly, "Rhinos in Swaziland," Pachyderm, no. 24 (1997), 65.

9

Tom Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment Report to Improve Law
Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project (Cambridge: TRAFFIC International, 2014).

10
Richard H. Emslie, African Rhinoceros: Latest Trends in Rhino Numbers and Poaching (Geneva,
Switzerland: CITES Secretariat, 2013), 2.

2

Next to Swaziland geographically and comparatively, South Africa’s failure to
control rhino poaching provides a stark contrast. Less than an hour’s drive from
Swaziland is the Malelane Gate to South Africa’s Kruger National Park. This protected
area is the flagship site for South African National Parks, a world leader in wildlife
conservation, including rhinos. Few species illustrated South Africa’s strength in
conservation like the white rhino prior to 2007. In the 1960s, white rhinos were poached
to the brink of extinction; at their nadir, an estimated 20-50 white rhinos remained in the
world. 11 In the four decades following, South African conservationists restored this
population to over 20,000 animals, exporting rhinos to reestablish populations elsewhere
and keeping nearly 90 percent of the world’s rhinos within South African borders. 12 This
success in introducing rhinos coincided with effectively controlling their poaching; from
1990 to 2006, South Africa managed an average of just 15 animals lost to poaching per
year, with some years as few as five or six and only one year as high as 26. 13 Until the
current poaching crisis, South Africa led rhino conservation worldwide, and many
considered it the paradigm of successful conservation.
Yet in the last decade, South Africa reversed its earlier success in controlling
poaching. After 36 rhinos were poached in South Africa in 2006, the number of rhinos
poached in South Africa has nearly doubled every year since 2008. By 2014, over 1,200

11

Liana Sun Wyler and Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S.
Policy Congressional Research Service, 2013), 8.
12

Ibid.

13

Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus (London: TRAFFIC,
2012)., 69.
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rhinos were killed by poachers, with no ready solutions in sight. 14 Inside the Malelane
Gate lies Kruger National Park’s Intensive Protection Zone, where despite South African
Defense Force patrols, heliborne quick reaction forces with armed rangers and infrared
detection, and fences resembling a maximum security prison, more than two rhinos per
day continue to be lost to poachers. One of the world’s leading experts on wildlife
trafficking concisely summarized South Africa’s present state of rhino poaching:
“Africa’s rhinos face an ongoing crisis.” 15

The Puzzle
Why do some poor, weak countries control poaching?
The success of Nepal and Swaziland in controlling rhino poaching is puzzling,
especially given South Africa’s failure to do so. Both Nepal and Swaziland are relatively
weak and poor countries, where corruption and trafficking of other illicit products is
commonplace. Comparatively, South Africa has significantly more government capacity
and economic activity. Moreover, dominant theoretical paradigms that explain
conservation outcomes stress both state capacity and economic incentives as drivers of
successful conservation policies.
These divergent cases in the control of rhino poaching offer both specific and
general empirical puzzles. Specifically, I ask why campaigns to counter rhino poaching
have succeeded in countries with weak police capacity and poor socioeconomic

14

David McKenzie and Brent Swails, "Rhino Wars: Inside South Africa's Losing Battle to End Poaching,"
CNN, September 22, 2015.
15

Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment Report to Improve Law Enforcement
Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project, 22.

4

development, including both Nepal and Swaziland. This specific question underlines a
more general inquiry about conservation and environmental governance: why are some
communities more effective than others at controlling poaching?
Wildlife policy is a neglected topic in social science. Aside from brief mentions
by “most of the early anthropologists, wildlife and its use did not fit well the concepts of
either the modernization theorists or their dependency critics.” 16 Consequently, the study
of wildlife policy “remained the purview of natural scientists” up until the environmental
crises of the 1970s, 17 and “surprisingly little social science research has been directed
toward the topic of poaching.” 18
Where social science has considered wildlife use and conservation, two
theoretical strands dominate the literature: work emphasizing coercive structures of the
state, and explorations of individual preferences and markets regarding uses of wildlife.
A common assumption for understanding poaching attributes the practice to
insufficient government capacity and control. In research, this approach can focus on
inadequacies in administrative capacity or scientific knowledge, and “generally claims
that with greater political will, better information, better equipment, better staff, and more
money, policymakers and their agents would create wildlife policy to improve
conservation outcomes.” 19 Ostrom (1990) traces this approach to a fundamental
assumption of that a Leviathan or powerful coercive actor is needed to structure wildlife
16
Clark C. Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
17

Ibid.

18

Stephen L. Eliason, "The Illegal Taking of Wildlife: Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Poaching,"
Human Dimensions of Wildlife 4, no. 2 (1999), 29.
19

Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 6
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interactions and prevent over-consumption. 20 The significance of this embedded
assumption of conservation as a function of government capacity can be seen in green
militarization, increasingly militarized state and non-state responses to conservation and
especially poaching. 21 This approach leads one to conclude that state coercive and police
capacity are key to controlling poaching.
Parallel to this assumption that government capacity determines the control of
poaching is a liberal assumption that poaching is a function of actors’ preferences. In
contrast to the Leviathan, Ostrom identified this paradigm as a fundamental preference
for market solutions. 22 Gibson (1999) described this approach as featuring “the ‘human
dimensions’ of wildlife policy” while investigating “the incentives that policies generate
for the individuals who experience the externalities of living with wildlife.” 23 Gibson’s
own path-breaking work in explaining poaching extended this emphasis on actor
preferences to a new institutional approach, exploring how individuals and groups use

20
Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, no. 3859 (1968), 1243-1248.; William
Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973).; Garrett Hardin, Living
within Limits : Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos, eBook ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993).
21

Elizabeth Lunstrum, "Green Militarization: Anti-Poaching Efforts and the Spatial Contours of Kruger
National Park," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 104, no. 4 (2014), 816-832.

22
Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," The American Economic Review 57, no. 2
(1967), 347-359.; Omotunde E. G. Johnson, "Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure
Systems," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 1 (1972), 259-76.; Robert J. Smith, "Resolving the
Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife," Cato Journal 1, no. 2 (1981),
439-468.; W. P. Welch, "The Political Feasibility of Fuller Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of
Pollution and Fisheries," Policy Sciences 16, no. 2 (1983), 165-180.
23

Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 5-6.
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wildlife to gain private advantage. 24 In practice, this paradigm points toward economics
to explain poaching, particularly through ecotourism. 25
In this context, the contemporary crisis in rhino poaching provides a striking
puzzle. Countries with the strongest state capacity and economic sectors have
experienced runaway poaching, demonstrated most strongly in South Africa. Yet some
countries, particularly those with weak policy capacity and small economic sectors, have
successfully controlled rhino poaching.

24

Ibid.

25

Michael 't Sas-Rolfes, Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story (Bozeman: 2011).; Gregory
Warner, "Can Economics Save the African Rhino? : Planet Money : NPR," Npr Planet Money May 15,
2013.
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Table 1.1 Control of Rhino Poaching, By Country, 2005-2015.
Controlled (n=5)
•
•
•
•
•

Not Controlled (n=9)

•
Democratic Republic of Congo
•
India
•
Kenya
•
Malaysia
•
Mozambique
•
Namibia
•
South Africa
•
Vietnam
•
Zimbabwe
Excluded from analysis: Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda.

Botswana
Nepal
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia

Table 1.2 State Capacity, Measured by Government Revenue in 2005.
Poaching
Controlled
High State Capacity (revenue
None
> US$ 20 billion)

Low State Capacity
(revenue < US US$ 5 billion)

Botswana
Tanzania
Nepal
Zambia
Swaziland

8

Poaching
Not Controlled
India
South Africa
Malaysia (extirpation)
Vietnam (extirpation)
Kenya
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Mozambique (extirpation)
DR Congo (extirpation)

Table 1.3: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Visitors in 2005.
Poaching
Controlled
High Economic
Incentives
(Tourism > 1,000,000
visitors)
Low Economic
Incentives
(Tourism < 1,000,000
visitors)

Botswana

Tanzania
Nepal
Zambia
Swaziland

Poaching
Not Controlled
India
South Africa
Malaysia (extirpation)
Vietnam (extirpation)
Kenya
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Mozambique (extirpation)
DR Congo (extirpation)

Table 1.4: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Receipts in 2005.
Poaching
Controlled
High Economic
Incentives
(Receipts > US$ 400
million)

Botswana
Tanzania
Zambia

Low Economic
Incentives
(Receipts < US$ 400
million)

Nepal
Swaziland

Poaching
Not Controlled
Malaysia (extirpation)
South Africa
India
Vietnam (extirpation)
Kenya
Namibia
Mozambique (extirpation)
Zimbabwe
DR Congo (extirpation)

Moreover, among the countries that have effectively controlled poaching,
trafficking of other illicit products such as drugs, human persons, arms, and even rhino
horn poached from outside the country remains high, as does corruption. State capacity
and socioeconomic development are poor predictors of whether a country can effectively
control poaching. But the success of cases like Nepal and Swaziland in stopping this
particular type of crime, coupled with the co-existence of other criminal sectors, begs
9

systematic investigation. This dissertation investigates the reasons why, despite
conventional wisdom to the contrary, anti-rhino poaching campaigns have been effective
in poor, weak countries.

The Argument
Constructing rhinos in non-economic ways makes poaching a taboo trade-off,
facilitating the control of poaching through moral outrage and moral cleansing.
At the risk of offering a simple explanation, I argue that understanding successful
rhino conservation today comes down to money. Amid the fantastically lucrative profit
potential that exists anywhere there is rhino horn, poaching occurs where people see
rhinos as economic opportunities. However, social psychology suggests that economic
perspectives are just one form of social relationship. 26 In contrast, when people see rhinos
as part of their community or important to a common authority, effective control of rhino
poaching becomes possible.
I argue that when people when people construct rhinos in reference to their
community or an authority, poaching rhinos becomes a taboo-tradeoff and elicits the
moral outrage and cleansing behaviors that facilitate its effective control. 27 Such moral

26

Alan Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free
Press, 1991).; A. P. Fiske, "The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory of
Social Relations," Psychological Review 99, no. 4 (October, 1992), 689-723.
27

Alan Fiske and Philip Tetlock, "Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that Transgress the
Spheres of Justice," Political Pyschology 18, no. 2 (1997), 255-297.; P. E. Tetlock et al., "The Psychology
of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals." Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 5 (May, 2000), 853-70.; Craig MacMillan and Colin Wastell,
"Taboo Trade-Offs, Moral Outrage and the Moral Limits of Markets," Macquarie Economics Research
Papers 2 (2008).; A. Peter McGraw, Janet A. Schwartz and Philip E. Tetlock, "From the Commercial to the
Communal: Reframing Taboo Trade-Offs in Religious and Pharmaceutical Marketing," Journal of
Consumer Research 39, no. 1 (June, 2012), 157.

10

outrage and cleansing behaviors are absent in communities where people construct rhinos
as economic resources, leaving the control of rhino poaching to the capacity of the police
and/or market incentives.
Bridging literature on the governance of socio-ecological systems, psychological
decision-making, and illicit markets, I explain the effectiveness of anti-rhino poaching in
the following way: where non-market priced relational schemata predominate in a
community’s orientation towards rhinos, rhino poaching becomes a taboo-trade off.
Poachers threaten the social relationships of individuals in that community, who respond
by symbolically disassociating themselves with the poachers (expressing moral outrage)
and seeking to punish both poachers (norm violators) and those who tolerate poaching
(metanorm violators). These behaviors buttress police capacity and dampen profit
incentives for poaching, thereby facilitating effective policy responses to poaching.
My approach follows the leading edge of understanding conservation outcomes
by focusing on institutions within communities. By studying relational models and
governance rules as institutions, I follow Ostrom (1990)’s path-breaking work showing
community institutions as decisive for common pool resources (CPRs). Ostrom called for
“theoretical development that can help identify variables that must be included in any
effort to explain and predict when appropriates user smaller-scale CPRs are more likely
to self-organize and govern their own CPRs, and when they are more likely to fail.” 28
This dissertation identifies relational models as critical variables for such analysis.
My approach also recognizes that such institutions cut both ways, enabling and
challenging successful conservation outcomes. Gibson (1999) demonstrates institutions
28
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 183.

11

“thwart or augment natural resource conservation,” interacting with “wildlife policies that
[can] have little relevance or legitimacy in the eyes of those individuals who can make or
break conservation initiatives.” 29 My research demonstrates how non-economic
constructions of wildlife can enable the control of poaching, and conversely, how
economic approaches can thwart such control and potentially lead to more poaching.
By focusing my analysis on norms within communities, my research joins other
leading contemporary work critically exploring conservation outcomes. Agrawal and
Gibson (2001) call exploring how community institutions influence outcomes of political
processes in conservation, particularly in norms that “may not prevent over-exploitation
of resources” and may even “be a significant part of the problem to a conservationist if a
norm promotes exploitation.” 30 Relational models show why some norms mitigate
against resource exploitation, while norms contribute to it. Investigating the varying
modes of thought expressed in relational models, relational models theory can illuminate
“the appropriate conjunction of theories of bounded rationality and full rationality,”
identified by Ostrom, Gardiner and Walker as key to theoretically understanding common
pool resource dilemmas. 31 Lastly, this dissertation avoids Ostrom’s “panacea trap” of
studying resource governance. 32 By considering the full universe of cases for rhino range
states, and particular outcomes of case studies in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa,

29

Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 164.

30

Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson, eds., Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the
State in Community-Based Conservation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 20 and 11.

31

Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 327.
32
Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox, "Moving Beyond Panaceas: A Multi-Tiered Diagnostic Approach for
Social-Ecological Analysis," Environmental Conservation 37, no. 04 (2010), 451-463.

12

this research demonstrates that relational models are an important consideration in “a
diagnostic approach in selecting appropriate starting points for governance and
monitoring” and facilitating “learning from the outcomes of new policies and adapting in
light of effective feedback.” 33 Each case is unique, yet the innate, fundamental, and
universal role of relational models occurs across this variance. 34 This dissertation will
demonstrate that relational models matter for explaining the effective control of
poaching.

The Evidence
Analysis of institutional rules associated with rhino conservation suggests a
relationship between non-economic relational models and successful control of
poaching. Case studies of Nepal, South Africa, and Swaziland illustrate how noneconomic approaches facilitate control of poaching through moral outrage and
cleansing, even where state capacity is weak and profit incentives are high.
To explore the question of why some countries have effectively controlled rhino
poaching while others have not, I compare the universe of cases of countries with wild
rhino populations. I specifically consider institutions involved with protected area
management, building on work such as Gibson (1999) and Ostrom (1991) highlighting
the critical role of institutions in understanding wildlife policy and common pool resource

33

Ibid.

34

Alan P. Fiske, "Relational Models Theory 2.0," in Relational Models Theory: A Contemporary
Overview, ed. Nick Haslam (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 3.

13

governance. 35 I also consider factors such as state capacity and economic preferences,
while showing these are insufficient for explaining why some countries have effectively
controlled rhino poaching while most have not.
I utilize several types of evidence to support my argument, including analysis of
all states with wild rhinos (rhino range states) and qualitative data from three case
studies: South Africa, Swaziland, and Nepal.
Before proceeding farther in my argument, I will briefly define terms I will refer
to throughout this book. A rhino is any odd-toed ungulate from the animal family
Rhinocerotidae. 36 There are five extant species of rhino, two in Africa (the white
rhinoceros, Ceratotherium simum, and the black rhinoceros, Diceros bicornis), and three
in Asia (the Indian rhinoceros, Rhinoceros unicornis, the Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros
sondaicus, and the Sumatran rhinoceros (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis). In total, 29,000
rhinos remain in the world, a population decline of 94% in the last century and 60% in
the last 45 years. 37
In 2008, rhinos existed in the wild in 12 African countries and 5 Asian countries;
these are collectively known as rhino range states. 38 Of the African rhino range states,
Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe each have

35

Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa; Ostrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 280

36
For an excellent history of the rhino as species, see Kelly Enright, Rhinoceros (London: Reaktion Books,
Ltd., 2008).
37
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populations greater than 100 rhinos. In Asia, India, Indonesia and Nepal have populations
greater than 100 rhinos. Since the current crisis began, rhinos have become extinct in
Vietnam in 2010, 39 in Mozambique in 2013, 40 and in probably in Malaysia by 2013. 41
Poaching is “any act that intentionally contravenes the laws and regulations
established to protect wild, renewable resources,” including rhinos. 42 This includes illegal
harvesting of wildlife, but also ancillary activities such as purchasing, transporting,
possessing, using, and other activities associated with illegal wildlife trafficking.
Poaching occurs in a variety of forms, including both sustenance hunters and trophy
hunters. 43 However, this dissertation focuses on commercial or market poaching—
poaching to gain economic benefits— as this is the primary driver of the current crisis in
rhino poaching. 44 Poaching is controlled when rhinos are no longer poached in an area,
aside from sporadic isolated incidents.
This dissertation will refer extensively to relational models, structures that guide
social interactions. Fiske (1991) identified four fundamental, innate, and universal
relational models that structure most, if not all, social action, thought, and motivation.
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The four models structure interactions between individuals based on (1) what they
have in common, or communal sharing; (2) ordered differences, or authority ranking; (3)
additive imbalances, or equality matching; or (4) ratios, or market pricing. These models
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Why Study Rhinos?
Conservation of the world’s most financially valuable animal offers
important insight for environmental politics, global governance, illicit market
trafficking, and political economy.

There are compelling theoretical reasons to study varying outcomes in the control
of rhino poaching. First, rhino poaching provides rich insight into environmental politics.
Rhinos are simultaneously vulnerable and valuable; their very existence reflects the
authoritative allocation of value. They are charismatic megafauna, popular animals that
focus attention on conservation issues and priorities. 45 After being hunted to the brink of
extinction in the 1950s, anywhere a rhino exists in the wild represents some form of
successful wildlife conservation policy and practice. Yet rhinos demand much from
ecosystems; conserving the world’s second largest land mammal can entail costs
approaching $40,000 USD per animal per year. Moreover, rhino horn is presently the
world’s most valuable commodity by weight, exceeding both licit commodities like gold
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and illicit items such as cocaine. 46 As such, policies and outcomes associated with rhinos
are inherently political.
Second, rhinos also provide insight into understanding governance, including
global governance. Rhino conservation involves diverse actors drawing from wide ranges
of authority, including state conservation and security actors, international conservation
and development organizations, celebrities, natural and social scientists, international and
local non-governmental organizations, and transnational criminal networks. Intersecting
relationships of authority and accountability complicate rhino conservation actions, and
rhino poaching outcomes can illuminate these dynamics. In this sense, rhinos can be
considered indicator species not only for their environments, but also for contemporary
global governance.
Third, rhino poaching is an important case for understanding trafficking and illicit
markets. Rhino poaching involves a complex network of trafficking in wildlife, weapons,
drugs, and human beings. 47 These networks cross boundaries of licit and illicit behaviors,
blurring national boundaries and reaching into everyday lives. 48 With ties crossing into
transnational criminal syndicates and terrorism, wildlife trafficking has recently become
an official national security concern of the leading powers, including the United States. 49
Yet in many respects, rhino poaching also presents a clearer subject than related cases
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such as elephant poaching or big cat poaching. Rhino populations exist in relatively
small, well-documented populations. Poached rhino create large signatures, and
consequently nearly all rhino poaching events are discovered and documented, enabling
clear identification of outcomes in the control of rhino poaching. As such, rhino poaching
may offer visibility into the frequently opaque world of wildlife trafficking.
Moreover, the small universe of rhino range states feeding the single global
market for rhino horn facilitates comparative analysis of varying national responses to a
global price shock. Prior to 2006, rhino poaching rates had remained essentially stable for
the previous twenty years. The price of rhino horn on global markets was also essentially
stable, at approximately $1,000 USD per kilogram. 50 However, by 2008, surging demand
from Vietnam coincided with skyrocketing price in rhino horn. 51 By 2015, the global
price for rhino horn was estimated to exceed $100,000 USD per kilogram, making rhino
horn the most expensive commodity in the world by weight. 52 This hundredfold increase
in price triggered an explosion in rhino poaching around the world, as poaching rates
grew exponentially each year since 2008. Understanding why some countries have
controlled rhino poaching, while most have not, can help us understand divergent
responses to changes in global markets.
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Figure 1.1: Price per kilogram of Rhino Horn, 1950-2015
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Policy Implications
Stop making rhino conservation about money.
The policy implications for understanding the control of rhino poaching are stark
and immediate. Wild rhino populations are in crisis, and could face extinction within 10
years. Officials in South Africa are incrementally legalizing rhino horn exchanges; this
policy could lead South Africa to restore the international trade in rhino horn or withdraw
from the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), one of
the world’s most successful international institutions. At the same time, efforts to counter
rhino poaching increasingly resemble armed conflict. Each year, hundreds of poachers
and rangers are killed in firefights contesting rhinos and elephants. 53 Drastic measures
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beyond combat include controversial dehorning of live rhinos and airlifting rhinos to
potential sanctuary locations in Botswana. 54 Yet despite the assumption that rhinos will
be safer in Botswana than elsewhere in Africa, little knowledge exists as to whether or
why Botswana is more effective at controlling rhino poaching.
This dissertation will show that social constructions of rhino play a critical
influence on whether or nor their poaching can be effectively controlled. As such,
conservation measures that reinforce market-priced social constructions may not only be
ineffective, they may actually increase the likelihood of rhino poaching.

Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, I identify a social
theory of the control of poaching, building on Fiske’s relational model approach to
develop testable hypotheses regarding relational models and the control of rhino
poaching, plus alternative hypotheses considering state capacity and economic
conditions. In chapter three, I survey the universe of rhino range states, using formal
institutional rules as proxy measures for relational models to determinate relationships
between such models and poaching outcomes. In chapter four, I consider in depth the
cases of Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, to illustrate how individuals actually
manifest these relational models. In chapter five, I use an analytic narrative to examine
the role of moral mechanisms engendered by non-economic relational models in Nepal’s

54
Brian Clark Howard, "Largest Rhino Airlift Ever to Move 100 at-Risk Animals," National Geographic
News, March 30, 2015.

20

effective control of poaching. In chapter six, I conclude by summarizing my findings,
identifying their limitations, and addressing their theoretical and practical implications.

21

CHAPTER TWO: A SOCIAL THEORY OF CONTROLLING POACHING
RELATIONAL MODELS AND MORAL MECHANISMS
This chapter presents a social theory of the control of poaching. After a
literature review tracing contours in conservation literature emphasizing state
capacity, individual preference, and mediating communities, this chapter focuses on
contemporary research into wildlife value orientations and individual decisions
whether to poach or not poach. Relational models theory offers explanatory
potential for this decision, particularly through the sacred value protection model
and moral responses to taboo trade-off reasoning. The chapter synthesizes this
literature into a social theory for the control of poaching, including alternative
hypotheses for conventional explanations regarding state capacity and economic
incentives, before concluding with a research design to investigation observable
implications in conservation outcomes involving poaching.
Literature on environmental politics and conservation points to individual
decision-making as critical to understanding poaching. 55 Yet why individuals choose to
poach or not poach is not understood, nor how communities control poaching behavior. I
begin this chapter by summarizing the three major themes in understanding wildlife
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policy and conservation outcomes, which collectively point to an individual decision in
the context of structuring community. In the second section, I show how relational
models can help explain this decision, namely whether individuals choose to poach. In
the third section, I apply relational models theory to advance a social theory of the control
of rhino poaching, including general and specific hypotheses for the impact of relational
models on poaching outcomes. In the fourth section, I introduce my research design and
justify claims I am making in this investigation.

Major Approaches to Understanding Wildlife Policy and Conservation Outcomes
Political science literature addressing environmental outcomes like poaching
developed along three major themes: an original emphasis on structures of state coercive
capacity, a later focus on the role of market incentives and individual preferences, and
current work exploring the role of communities in shaping conservation. These themes
emerged only recently, as political science largely neglected conservation and wildlife
policy for much of the field’s development.
In the field of political science, wildlife and conservation are nascent objects of
interest, particularly in the developing world. Bryant and Bailey (1997) characterized the
related study of political ecology as “an emerging research field” that before the 1980s,
“could scarcely be said to have existed at all.” 56 This field’s youth results from an
artificial independence between social and natural sciences, and “the assumption that
environmental politics can be separated from the principles and laws of environmental
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science.” 57 Gibson (1999) noted that “social scientists have generally ignored African
wildlife as a topic of research,” leaving such studies to “the purview of natural
scientists.” 58 Gibson attributed this neglect to the ill fit of conservation with dominant
theoretical approaches within social sciences, particularly modernization. 59 As a result,
Ostrom (1990) observed, “We do not yet have the necessary intellectual tools or models
to understand the array of problems that are associated with governing and managing
natural resource systems.” 60 As recently as 2003, an editorial in the journal Conservation
Biology declared that “the social sciences must become central to conservation science
and practice,” noting the question “is not whether to integrate the social sciences into
conservation but how to do so.” 61 To acquire such tools and integrate social science into
understanding conservation, political scientists initially turned to the structuring capacity
of the state.
This initial focus within conservation literature emphasized the coercive capacity
of the state to solve the problem of resource use exceeding environmental limits. Hardin
(1968) called attention to this so-called tragedy of the commons, plainly stately that
“individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal
ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other
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goals.” 62 Ophuls (1977) argued that for effective collective action regarding the
environment, “the only solution is a sufficient measure of coercion,” and that “we shall
necessarily move from liberty toward authority, for the community will have to be given
sufficient means to enforce its demands on individuals.” 63 In his survey of conservation
challenges of the early 1970s, Ehrenfeld (1972) concluded, “If private interests cannot be
expected to protect the public domain, then external regulation by public agencies,
governments, or international authorities is needed.” 64 This theoretical focus on
structuring individual decisions through coercive state capacity appears in early
environmental policy interventions such as the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency (1970), the Clean Water (1972) and Endanger Species Protection (1973) Acts,
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (1973). However, this approach emphasizing state coercive structures paid
insufficient detail to agential interactions and roles of individual preferences.
A second theme of explanations for environmental outcomes focuses on how
individuals respond to structuring environments. Assuming that individuals seek to
maximize benefits and minimize costs, Demsetz (1967) emphasized the function of
property regimes in internalizing effects of resource allocation, both beneficial and
harmful. Demsetz specifically argued for private property institutions as a solution to
poaching, citing the emergence of such rights in some indigenous American communities
engaged in the fur trade. Based largely on his analysis of Frank G. Speck’s anthropologic
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research on Montagnais Indians in Quebec and Labrador, Demsetz noted “the fur trade
made it economic to encourage the husbanding of fur-bearing animals. Husbanding
requires the ability to prevent poaching and this, in turn, suggests that socioeconomic
changes in property in hunting land will take place.” 65 Demsetz’s conclusion was purely
functional, failing to consider colonial influences nor any motivation beyond individual
wealth maximization. Similarly, O. Johnson (1972) argued that a lack of private property
rights inhibits “rapid growth” in land-using activities, assuming that rapid growth equates
to increasing value. 66 These works explored individual responses to structures, but
privileged the assumption that individuals seek first to maximize private ends.
Later scholars extended this focus on privatization to normative dimensions.
Smith (1981) argues that “the problem of overexploitation or overharvesting is a result of
the resource’s being under public rather than private ownership.” 67 After revisiting
Speck’s analysis of the Montagnais Indians, Smith goes on to cite “game ranches,
hunting preserves, safari parks, and animal and bird farms” as “examples of how private
ownership can successfully preserve wildlife.” 68 This leads Smith to flatly conclude:
the single most important element in wildlife survival was their removal from
common property ownership. . . . The problems of environmental degradation,
overexploitation of natural resources, and depletion of wildlife all derive from
their existence as common property resources. Wherever we find an approach to
the extension of private property rights in these areas, we find superior results. 69
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According to this approach, if one wishes to prevent the overharvesting of
wildlife, privatization is the only solution. Other major works that explore environmental
outcomes from a liberal perspective include Sinn (1984), who studied the effect of
ownership structures on oil markets, and Welch (1983), who examined the feasibility of
privatizing ownership structures. 70 In exploring consequences of who owns natural
resources, this literature shifted focus from earlier capacity based explanations to the
human dimensions of wildlife policy.
The human dimension of wildlife policy locates conservation outcomes at the
individual level of analysis. Bell (1987) called for “conservation with a human facing,”
declaring “any programme that emphasizes long-term communal benefits at the expense
of short-term individual benefits will be met with resistance.” 71 Despite judging
“utilitarian justification of conservation to be opportunistic, unrealistic, and
counterproductive,” Bell identifies that “public discussion of costs and benefits is
couched almost exclusively in terms of . . . the utilitarian and monetary consequences of
conservation or the lack of it.” 72 Bell attributed this to prevailing consensus that nonmonetary conceptions of value are “frivolous and will carry insufficient weight with
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governments and rural interface populations.” 73 This privileging of monetary conceptions
of value permeates a related concept, community-based conservation.
Community-based conservation is the idea that delivering benefits to individual
users of wildlife is a necessary component of successful conservation outcomes. Deeply
embedded in this concept is the construction of benefits in economic terms. For instance,
Little (1994) stated the “critical role that economic incentives play in motivating
community-based conservation is now widely accepted,” even while noting that
“[e]conomic benefits from community-based conservation are rarely documented
systematically.” 74 Bromley (1994) flatly declared that the “answer, in brief, is to be found
in the structure of entitlements (often called property rights) and in the constellation of
incentives and sanctions that emanate from them.” 75 Bromley argued incentives
ultimately reduce to prices, as the “ability of market institutions to resolve conflicting
human demands on the environment relies [on actors] guided by market prices . . . .
Prices signal to human actors what actions are right” (emphasis added). 76 Bromley
caveats his argument by referencing a safe minimal standard, acknowledging that when
“irreversibilities are present, it may be prudent to take steps to avoid the small probability
that our actions may set in train events leading to the disappearance of certain
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presumptively valuable biological resources.” 77 Not withstanding this potential for small
probabilities of potential extinctions, the market approach assumes that conservation will
not occur unless prices make it profitable.
This market-based approach developed against objections that wildlife cannot or
should not be thought of in monetary terms. Stoddard (1951) was an early proponent of
such economic valuations. In an important essay, Stoddard argued that although until
“now wildlife crops [were] considered to have an intangible economic value, . . . the
mere fact that society is willing to pay for [conservation] is indicative of the presence of
tangible, though not marketable, values.” 78 Therefore, Stoddard concluded the “time has
come when our society must make a choice- either to permit the continued depletion of
wildlife environment in favor of commodity agriculture, or to determine ways and means
whereby landowners will be provided with incentives, economic and otherwise, for
producing wildlife crops.” 79 Crutchfield (1962) sparked a prominent research program
aimed at determining these tangible values, arguing that the varied uses of wildlife can be
captured and modeled in a “logical framework within which these essential comparisons
can be made and the greatest possible economic product realized from given resource”
levels. 80 This search for ways to quantify the value of wildlife predicated on an assumed
priority towards maximizing economic growth.
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Translating wildlife into money was at the center of this economic approach.
Langford and Cocheba (1978) argued that money can serve as a “cardinal index of
satisfaction” based on the consumer’s surplus concept. 81 While acknowledging “money is
certainly not a perfect unit of measure,” they argue “some of the persistent arguments
against using it for this purpose are indefensible” as the “fact remains that money is the
medium of exchange in our society” and “only the naïve believe that using money to
measure value implies a materialistic ethic.” 82 Cocheba and Langford (1978) explored
several ways to determine this economic value of wildlife, arguing “it is possible to
incorporate both a collective and a private good dimension of value into a single
model.” 83 These collective and private goods dimensions hinged on an economic
measurement expressed in money, sometimes expressed as use and non-use values of
wildlife.
The monetization of wildlife was advanced as the best path to conservation.
Gray’s (1993) “Picasso and Pachyderm” analogy compared elephant conservation to a
Picasso painting. Noting that the price commanded by art such as a Picasso painting does
not detract from the art’s intrinsic aesthetic qualities, Gray argued that “the greatest value
of elephants is as a tourist attraction.” 84 Noting a 1990 study that determined a living
elephant as generating $14,375 USD per year compared to the $1,880 USD yielded from
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harvesting that elephant’s ivory, Gray advised this “comparison should be widely
publicized in Africa.” 85 Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya (1990) studied an ecotourism
project in Zambia, and concluded that when profits from conservation were made
available to locals through ecotourism, “poaching dropped dramatically, local economies
were improved, and village attitudes towards wildlife management and conservation
became more positive.” 86 This study shows the heart of the economic approach: find
ways to make conservation pay.
To make conservation profitable for individuals, the market approach focused on
the functional aspects of institutions. Ostrom (1990) described this as shifting from the
tragedy of the common’s game of user against user to a individual’s game against nature
in a smaller, privately held property. 87 Gibson summarized this emphasis on markets as
conservation solutions as:
the process in which policymakers realize the importance of a new conservation
policy . . . . and then construct and implement it. That is, because there is a
realization that humans living in wildlife should participate in gain and participate
in conservation activities, wildlife policies will follow. 88
In addition to its ontological focus on institutions, this approach embedded an assumption
of utility maximization into conservation, most significantly in the concept of sustainable
development.
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Sustainable development assumes that conservation and wildlife policy decisions
should maximize utility for those who live with wildlife. First proposed in the Brundtland
Commission’s report Our Common Future, this concept sees suboptimal environmental
outcomes as consequences of poverty and underdevelopment, which must therefore be
addressed through poverty reduction and development. This report “brought political
respectability to the marriage of ecology and economics.” 89 The idea that environmental
outcomes are fundamentally economic has dominated international institutional actions
towards the environment since the Brundtland report, most notably at the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio di Janeiro and at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. 90
In fact, the first principle declared outright at the 1992 Earth Summit’s Convention on
Biodiversity was that all states have “a sovereign right to exploit their own resources.” 91
Yet despite the dominance of economic assumptions in understanding conservation, more
recent work has moved beyond state capacity and rational choice analysis to focus on
local explanations of conservation.
Reflecting a broader theoretical turn towards new institutionalism, this third
theme in conservation literature focuses on communities as a level of analysis that
integrates both structural factors and individual decisionmaking. Ostrom (1990) heralded
this turn towards community as she rejected early prescriptions of the coercive state or
the free market as single solutions to conservation challenges. Rather, Ostrom pointed to
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a variety of institutional arrangements that can succeed, observing that successful
conservation outcomes result from “rich mixtures of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’
institutions defying classification in a sterile dichotomy.” 92 Even strong advocates for
conservation through privatization acknowledge that “[o]ften omitted from policy
prescriptions is the possibility that a nongovernmental community of users can manage
common areas and prevent overexploitation.” 93 Ostrom would later summarize this
research as a “diagnostic approach” moving “beyond panaceas,” focusing on socialecological systems (SESs) as a means to explain successful conservation and
environmental governance outcomes. 94 SES are “social systems in which some of the
interdependent relationships among humans are mediated through interactions with
biophysical and non-human biological units.” 95 Principle components of an SES are a
resource system where actors extract resource units in an action situation, according to
rules of an overarching governance system. 96
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Figure 2.1: Social-Ecological Systems Model

Source: McGinnis and Ostrom 2014
Moving beyond state- or market-prescriptions explains conservation successes and
failures as outcomes of political institutions within communities.
This community focus appears in key contemporary works within conservation
literature. Chute (1999) revisited the case behind Demsatz’s seminal argument for private
property regimes, concluding this is more accurately explained as resilient community
practices rather than profit-driven private ownership. 97 Gibson (1999) examined wildlife
policy in Africa, and demonstrated that political institutions significantly influence
conservation outcomes, and are not well explained by typical conservation policy
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analyses or rational approaches to environmental politics. 98 Gibson concluded his study
by calling for more understanding of the relevance and legitimacy of “those individuals
who can make or break conservation initiatives . . . . [who] possess different sets of
preferences about what they consider to be the ‘appropriate’ rules governing wildlife
resources.” 99 From this approach, conservation research looked to where individuals
interact with wildlife and each other in local communities.
As scholars have focused on political institutions within communities, important
critical questions regarding conservation have come to the fore. Agrawal and Gibson
(2001) note a disconnect between the concept of communities as territorially fixed, small
and homogeneous groups with the reality of diverse interests and actors, local-level
processes, and institutional arrangements. 100 This underexplored linkage between the
concept of community and reality is particularly pronounced regarding norms, which can
both promote and hinder conservation. Agrawal and Gibson observe that norms “in fact,
may be a significant part of the problem to a conservationist if a norm promotes
exploitation (posing an enormous obstacle for those interested in community-based
conservation).” 101 To better explain when community accomplish successful collective
action towards conservation, they call for increased study of social variables within
community.
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A particularly promising category of social variables are individual orientations
towards wildlife. This approach synthesizes insights from both state-centric and private
market approaches, considering the human dimension of individuals within governing
structures, and variance in how individuals value wildlife. Manfredo and Dayer (2004)
surveyed a range of literature pertaining to social aspects of conservation, proposing that
wildlife value orientations are key to understanding human wildlife conflict. 102 Manfredo,
Teel and Henry (2009) identified contrasting ideologies of domination versus mutualism
in wildlife value orientations in North America, suggesting this variance may explain
broader social-ecological outcomes. As Teel et al (2010) argued:
Our theory contends that individual behavior toward wildlife is driven by specific
attitudes (i.e., the association of an evaluation and an object in memory), and
these attitudes are directed by wildlife value orientations. The latter are beliefs
reflective of broad cultural ideologies that give personal meaning of right and
wrong and an ideal life to one’s more basic values in relation to wildlife. They
play an important role in explaining variation in individuals’ wildlife- related
actions and their attitudes toward topics related to wildlife treatment. As a result,
differences in wildlife value orientations can form the foundation for conflict
among diverse publics on wildlife issues and management strategies. 103

This focus on social values towards wildlife as a key explanatory variable has
been replicated in wolf management studies by Sponarski et al (2014). 104 Moreover, the
concept of wildlife value orientations has been generalized and documented in countries
outside North America, as shown by Vaske, Jacobs, and Sijtsma’s (2011) study of the
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Netherlands. 105 These studies suggest that a key influence at the communal level of
analysis lies in how individuals within that community construct wildlife.

Figure 2.2: Major Approaches to Explaining Poaching

Summarizing this review, social science neglected conservation as a research
topic for much of its history. Early efforts to explore conservation outcomes initially
focused on the structuring capacity of the state, and later turned to an emphasis on
ownership structures and individual incentives regarding wildlife. More recently, scholars
have focused on the role of communities, particularly in how social factors influence
individual decision-making amid structured interactions with wildlife.
In the next section, I identify how social factors identified by Relational Models
theory can affect conservation outcomes and a community’s control of poaching.

How Relational Models Can Explain the Control of Poaching
Extant literature explaining conservation outcomes points to individual social
factors as a key explanatory variable, particularly regarding wildlife value orientations.
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However, it is not clear what social factors matter, and what dimensions of wildlife value
orientations matter. This dissertation argues that relational models offer a powerful
explanation of not only how social factors can vary, but even more so, why such variance
matters.
Relational models is a social psychological theory that argues all human
relationships are structured in one of four ways. Fiske (1991) first proposed that humans
organize relationships according to what people have in common, ordered differences,
additive imbalances, or ratios. 106 Labeling these respective approaches as Communal
Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market-Pricing
(MP), Fiske argued that individuals use these models to generate social relationships.
Therefore, "[t]hese implicit models are the psychological foundations of social relations
and society." 107 Each model varies in distinct and recognizable ways.
Communal Sharing is the model built on what people have in common. In this
model, individual identities blur in contrast to group membership and a common identity,
marked by boundaries with outsiders. Fiske described the essence of Communal Sharing
as "a relationship based on duties and sentiments generating kindness and generosity
among people conceived to be of the same kind." 108 An example of a Communal Sharing
relationship is the ideal of a parent and child and other forms of kinship. People are
motivated by what they believe they share with others.
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The Authority Ranking model structures interaction by reference to a common
authority. As such, this model generates inequality: higher ranked people "control more
people things, or land than others, and may be thought to possess more knowledge and
mastery over events." 109 While higher ranked individuals have more control and
prerogative, this model is nevertheless inclusive as the hierarchy encompasses its
members. Fiske clarifies that this model is distinct from coercive power, as individuals
accept their subordination as legitimate, rather than something imposed from outside. An
example of an Authority Ranking relationship is that between a military commander and
a subordinate. The key aspect of this model is inequality referenced by a common
authority.
Equality Matching focuses on additive imbalances. As with Authority Ranking,
individuals are separate, but in this model they are also equal. As such, this model
features one-to-one balances of social activities such as shares, contributions and
influence. The range of this matching includes turn taking, in-kind reciprocity,
compensating in equal measure, even distribution into equal parts, and matched
contributions of the same kind and quality. Individuals using the Equality Matching
model "conceive of each other- or the rights, duties or actions involved in the relationship
as distinct, but as balancing each other, aligning or matching, so they are
interchangeable." 110 An example of this model is the ideal relationship between spouses
in a contemporary Western marriage. As with Communal Sharing and Authority
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Ranking, Equality Matching sees a community as the basis for the relationship and
individual behavior.
Market Pricing is unlike the other three models in that individuals exist as
bounded discrete actors mediated through a market system and market determined values.
In this model, individuals measure value through a universal metric, usually price or
utility, enabling the comparison of "any two persons or associated commodities,
qualitatively alike or unlike." 111 This leads to ratios and proportionality, often with
explicit references to "potential substitutes, complements, and temporal conditions." 112 In
contrast to the previous three model's emphasis on equal membership in the community,
this model precisely enables unequal relationships among individuals without
community. An example of Market Pricing is a commercial transaction between a vendor
and a purchaser. However, Market Pricing models also occur in non-monetized decisions
such as insurance actuarial tables and military decision-making calculations like fighter
plane losses to air defenses, infantry kill ratios, and civilian causality acceptability
rates. 113 The essence of this model is the comparison of unlike things mediated by a
universal metric, typically money.
Though simple in form, these models are fundamental, general, elementary, and
universal. 114 Individuals employ all four models across a range of contexts, including
cultures, and the same individual may use multiple models simultaneously to relate to
111
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different things, as well as changing what model that individual uses over time. Building
from this basic approach, relational models theory makes a bold claim: "the social
universe may also be based on just four basic relational bonds. The diversity and
complexity of human societies, institutions, and relationships results from diverse
manifestations and combinations of the four models.” 115
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Table 2.1: Relational Models
Relational Model

Communal Sharing

Authority Ranking

Equality Matching

Market Pricing

Structured According
To

What people have in
common

Characteristics
- Defined items held in
common (e.g. blood,
religion, employer,
leader)
- Dyad, group, or
community
- Boundaries
- Undifferentiated
individuals within group
- Duties and
responsibilities
- Varying intensity

- Linear ranking
- Varied statuses,
prerogatives, attention,
and entitlements
Transitive asymmetrical - Rank associated with
extensions of self
differences
- Hierarchical inclusion
- Tendency to assimilate
- Legitimate rather than
coercive

Additive differences
referencing an even
balance

Ratios

- Egalitarian peers
- Distinct but co-equal
- Differences as additive
and subtractive
- Culturally coordinated

- Markets determine value
- Numbers
- Cost-benefits
- Proportionality
- Relational equity
- Utilitarian moral
reasoning
- Explicit substitution

Examples

- Parents and children
- Kinship
- Blood rituals
- Alumni
- Crop shares
- Secret societies
- Misfortune (e.g. AA)
- Nationality

- Bosses and workers
- Age
- Caste
- Seniority
- Achievement based on
tests or contests
- Possession of symbolic
authority
- Election or delegation
- Modern Western
marriages
- Turn taking
- Coin-flip
- Eye for eye
- Baby-sitting coops
- Matching contributions
- Dinner invitations
-Prices
-Wages
-Rents
-Interests
-Dividends
-Efficiency Calculations

Source: Fiske 1991, Fiske 2004.

In the two decades since Fiske proposed relational models theory, research has
validated this approach both theoretically and empirically. Haslam (2004) surveyed
existing literature applying Fiske's model, finding extensive support for "the structural
42

postulates of the theory," in addition to broad resonance in larger literature. Among other
topics, relational models theory has been applied to families in China (Chuang 2005),
personal values (Biber, Hupfeld and Meier 2008) and gender dominance (Garcia,
Posthuma, and Roehling 2009) in cross-national studies, individualism and collectivism
across cultures (Vodosek 2009), secondary schools in Australia (Bagley 2010),
knowledge sharing (Boer, Berends, and Baalen 2011), and business to business
exchanges (Blois and Ryan 2012). 117 Such studies lead Haslam to conclude "evidence for
the structural adequacy of RMs theory is probably stronger than the evidence for any
other relational taxonomy." 118 Moreover, the models "have yet to be clearly outperformed
in an empirical test and has predicted a variety of phenomena" both across psychological
categories and across cultures. 119 While continuing research in psychology now explores
the causes of rational models, the significance of relational models to politics lies in their
role in constructing value.
How people value an object depends on the relationship(s) one uses the object in.
This is particularly relevant for relationships involving the transfer of valued objects.
Individuals "use each of the four fundamental models to organize transfers of material or
nonmaterial goods and services and to provide obligatory or ideal standards for such
117
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transitions." 120 With Communal Sharing, objects cannot be transferred since they are
common property to all. In Authority Ranking, higher persons have first rights and
prerogative to take first actions towards objects, with less ranked individuals acting
according to what is left to them. In Equality Matching, objects taken must be balanced
with objects given to maintain an evenness of exchange, and thus objects taken are
valued against other like or unlike objects. Finally, in Market Pricing, the value of objects
is fungible, and socially constructed. 121 Value derived from relational models is critical
for trade-off reasoning.

Table 2.2: Relational Models and Associated Values
Relational Model

Value of Associated
Object

Communal Sharing
Authority Ranking
Equality Matching
Market Pricing
Source: Fiske and Tetlock 1997

Incomparable / Sacred
Incomparable / Sacred
Incomparable / Sacred
Fungible / Secular

Tradeoff reasoning occurs when an individual compares one object to a different
object. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) identified three types of tradeoffs. 122 Two types of
trade-offs involve relational model from a single domain. Comparing two objects using
the Market Price model is a routine trade-off, involving some ratio of two fungible
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values. These routine trade-offs are central to many economic models and rational choice
theories. However, comparisons involving non-Market Priced models are qualitatively
distinct from routine trade-offs.
When individuals construct objects using non-Market Priced relational models,
such objects attain incomparable value. In the context of relationships with a community,
a hierarchy, or an equal partner, "people reject certain comparisons because they feel that
seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would undercut their self-images and social
identities as moral beings." 123 To explain this, Fiske and Tetlock draw on the
psychological concept of constitutive incommensurability: "two values are constitutively
incommensurable whenever people believe that entering one value into a trade-off
calculus with the other subverts or undermines that value." 124 Simply put, monetizing
aspects of some relationships such as one's friends, children, or country "disqualifies
oneself from certain social roles . . . . to compare is to destroy. Merely making explicit
the possibility of certain trade-offs weakens, corrupts, and degrades one's moral
standing.” 125 This deeply seated psychological aversion to comparing objects constructed
with non-Market Priced models (Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Equality
Matching) endows objects in some settings with incomparable value. Echoing
Durkheim's sacred-profane dialectic, Fiske and Tetlock refer to this incomparable value
as sacred value, in contrast to fungible values as secular. 126
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When an object attains sacred or incomparable value, two forms of trade-offs are
possible. First, a tragic trade-off compares two objects, both constructed with a nonMarket Priced model and therefore possessing sacred or incomparable value. Under such
circumstances, the trade-off is "comprehensible and potentially resolvable, however
painful the consequences . . . . Ambivalence may remain, and people may experience
great regret about the relationship they have given up, but the bonds are comparable." 127
An example of a tragic trade-off is a difficult pregnancy where the parents must chose
between the life of the mother and the life of the child, or a malnourished person
exchanging a family heirloom for food. The incomparable value of these objects makes
decision-making associated with them tragic. But when someone proposes comparing an
incomparable or sacred object to a fungible or secular object, the trade-off becomes
taboo.
A taboo trade-off involves the comparison of an object of incomparable, or
sacred, value to an object of fungible, or secular, value. Tetlock et al (2000) identify such
comparisons as being qualitatively distinct from other forms of trade-off reasoning. 128
According to Tetlock's Sacred Value Protection Model, an individual who constructs an
object's value as sacred using a non-Market Priced relational model will respond to a
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proposed fungible comparison in two distinctive ways. First, that individual will express
moral outrage:
a composite psychological state that subsumes cognitive reactions (harsh
character attributes to those who endorse the proscribed thoughts and even to
those who do not endorse, but do tolerate this way of thinking in others), affective
reactions (anger and contempt for those who endorse the proscribed thoughts),
and behavioral reactions (support for ostracizing and punishing deviant
thinkers). 129
Second, an individual encountering a taboo tradeoff will engage in moral
cleansing "that reaffirms core values and loyalties by acting in ways that shore up those
aspects of the moral order that have been undercut by the transgression." 130 These two
responses are the key psychological coping mechanisms of the Sacred Value Protection
Model (SVPM).
Relational models theory and the SVPM can potentially explain a range of
puzzling political behavior. As Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) argue, the "relational model
followed by a given institution or community will lead to different kinds of normfollowing logics and thus different implementation rules." 131 Noting that variance in
trade-off reasoning is "psychologically and politically consequential," they conclude that
if:
constructivism is to explain how actor's identities are mutually constituted with
structures, then we need to know which relational scheme structures interaction at
any given moment in time and how normative logics differ depending on which
of the three is dominant. 132
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Since its introduction, the SVPM has been used to explain variance in negotiations
(Robbennolt, Darley and MacCoun 2004, Harinck and de Dreu 2004), responses to the
9/11 terrorist attacks (Skitka, Bauman and Mullen 2004) and more general acts of
violence (van Zomeren and Lodewijkx 2005), protest participation (Lodewijkx, Kertsen
and van Zomeren 2008), democratic rhetoric (Marietta 2008), motivations for collective
action such as the Tiananmen Square protest (van Zomeran and Spears 2008) and
marginalization (van Zomeran, Postmes, and Spears 2011), trade in cadavers (Anteby
2010), intergroup identity (Sachdeva and Medin 2009) and relationships (Tauber and
Zomeren 2012), religious and pharmaceutical marketing (McGraw, Schwartz and Tetlock
2012), blame for financial crises (Inbar, Pizarro, and Cushman 2012), and attitudes to
video games (Rothmund et al 2015). 133 The SVPM has even been linked to physical
cleansing actions in a so-called Lady MacBeth effect. 134 Although it has not yet been
specifically applied to conservation topics or wildlife policy outcomes, Daw et al (2015)
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identify taboo-tradeoffs as an overlooked challenge to environmental management. 135
Elsewhere, McCalla, Short and Brantingham (2013) argue that sacred value networks can
explain variance in criminal behavior. 136 These works demonstrate relational models
theory’s potential in explaining conservation outcomes.

Table 2.3: Forms of Trade-Off Reasoning
Relational Model
Communal Sharing,
Authority Ranking, or
Equality Matching
Market Pricing

Communal Sharing,
Authority Ranking, or
Equality Matching

Market Pricing

Tragic Trade-Off

Taboo Trade-Off

Taboo Trade-Off

Routine Trade-Off

A Social Theory of Poaching

This social theory of poaching explains the control of poaching by focusing on
individuals and how they construct wildlife. This approach bridges literature from social
psychology and political economy, utilizing relational insights from the former to explain
divergent patterns of behavior in the latter. This theory begins by assuming that
individual preferences are socially constructed and not innate. As social constructions,
agents and structures mutually constitute such preferences through discursive practices.
The outcome of interest for this theory is the effective control of poaching in a
social-ecological system. Poaching is the harvesting of a natural resource that violates a
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law, and it is effectively controlled when poaching incidents are sporadic and result in the
punishment of poachers.
The explanatory variable for this theory is the relational model (mode of
interaction) pertaining to a resource that predominates among actors in the socialecological system. Possible values for this variable are Communal Sharing (CS),
Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), or Market Pricing (MP).
The causal mechanism of this theory varies with the predominant relational
model. If a Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching relational
model predominates among actors, then poaching is a taboo trade-off, causing moral
outrage and moral cleansing behaviors that facilitate effective control of the poaching.
However, if a Market Pricing relational model predominates among actors, than poaching
is a routine trade trade-off. Actors will conduct cost-benefit calculations, and if the payoff for poaching is sufficiently high, then poaching will not be controlled.
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Figure 2.3: Causal Relationships
When Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching
Predominates

When Market Pricing Predominates

51

Hypotheses
General Hypotheses
Given a social-ecological system with actors, resources, and lucrative price for the
resource:
H1. If the dominant relational model is CS, AR, or EM, then poaching will be
controlled.
H2. If the dominant relational model is MP, then poaching will not be controlled.

To control for alternative explanations involving state capacity and economic
incentives, we can add two further hypotheses.
H3. If there is high coercive capacity, then poaching will be controlled.
H4. If there are strong economic incentives to not poach, then poaching will be
controlled.

Specific Hypotheses
This theory can be applied to the puzzle of rhino poaching. The outcome variable,
control of poaching, can be operationalized by whether rhino poaching within a country
is sporadic or recurrent. When rhinos are poached, if the poaching is controlled, poachers
are caught and punished. If the poaching is not controlled, poachers are either not caught
or caught and not punished.
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The explanatory variable, the relational model pertaining to rhinos, is
operationalized in the discursive practices of individuals who live and work with and near
rhino populations. If individuals living near rhinos construct rhinos in reference to a
community, towards a shared authority, or in equality, then rhino poaching will elicit
moral outrage and moral cleansing behaviors in the populations. Individuals will
symbolically disassociate themselves from the poaching, and will seek to punish both
poachers and persons who approve of the poaching. In contrast, if individuals living near
rhinos construct rhinos according to a fungible ratio such as money, then poaching will
be a routine trade-off. Individuals will see the poaching in economic terms, and moral
outrage and cleansing will not be present. Moreover, under such circumstances, the
lucrative payoffs of rhino poaching in the absence of moral outrage and moral cleansing
may cause poaching practices to diffuse into the community as a learned behavior,
contributing to an expansion of poaching activities.

Research Design
This study investigates the control of rhino poaching through the lens of new
institutionalism, without privileging this lens’ rational choice, sociological, or historical
variants. My core hypothesis is when actors living near rhinos construct rhinos use a
relational model other than Market Pricing, then rhino poaching will be effectively
controlled due to moral outrage and moral cleansing mechanisms. Conversely, where
actors construct rhinos using the Market Pricing relational models, then rhino poaching
may not be controlled due to the absence of moral outrage and moral cleansing.
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To test this general hypothesis, in the next chapter I survey the universe of all
countries that had wild rhino populations prior to the start of the current crisis in rhino
poaching, 2007. In order to assess what relational model predominates in each country, I
first examine formal institutions pertaining to rhinos, specifically rules, as proxy
variables for relational models. In doing so, I assume a congruence between rules-in-form
and rules-in-use. 137 Based on this, I identify dominant relational models for each rhino
range state, coupled with analysis of whether each state has effectively controlled or
failed to control rhino poaching since 2007. This survey establishes a general pattern of
relationship between institution configurations and the effective control of rhino
poaching, enabling deeper analysis of key cases in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa.
In Chapter 4, I examine in detail the cases of Nepal, Swaziland and South Africa
to investigate whether individuals in these countries actually use the relational models
suggested by their formal institutional rules. Such formal rules suggest these three cases
offer ideal type variances, with the Communal Sharing relational model in Nepal, the
Authority Ranking relational model in Swaziland, and Market Pricing in South Africa.
In Chapter 5, I construct an analytic narrative of how Nepal effectively controlled
rhino poaching. In the process, I investigate whether moral outrage and cleansing
mechanisms offer superior explanatory ability for Nepal’s outcome than state capacity or
economic incentive based explanations.
In the end, I make no claim about the sufficiency or necessity of any particular
relational model for effectively controlling poaching. It is theoretically possible that in a
137

Mindful of Ostrom (2005)’s imperative to “dig under surface behavior to obtain a good understanding of
what rules participants in a situation are following,” this assumption is initially justified by the universal
scale of this analysis. See Ostrom, Elinor, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 19.

54

system where the Market Price model dominates, some level of poaching control is
possible if the resource population matches state capacity and economic incentives. 138
My claim is narrower: that in a country with weak police capacity and an immense
economic incentive to poach, the control of poaching is nevertheless possible under
certain social conditions. If true, dominant focuses on strengthening state capacity or
economically incentivizing non-poaching may at best be ineffective. At worst, these may
actually worsen the problem of poaching, particularly economic approaches.
Finally, I make no claims about what causes one relational model to dominate
over another. In the past century, nearly every rhino range state has poached its rhino
populations to the brink of extinction, including countries like Nepal and Swaziland
where contemporary rhino poaching has been effectively controlled. This empirically
suggests that relational models can change, and I welcome further research into this
aspect of relational models theory. In this vein, I make no claim about the long-term
resiliency of a system characterized by a non-Market Priced relational model in the
current environment of fantastic prices for rhino horn. Psychological research suggests
that moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms mute over time. 139 Similarly, governance
studies suggest that instability, change, and problematic control become more likely
when economic and sociological domains conflict. 140 The success of any one country is
unlikely to resolve a global crisis driven by fantastically lucrative prices for rhino horn.
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CHAPTER THREE: RELATIONAL MODELS AND THE CONTROL OF
POACHING
This chapter investigates relationships between relational models and the
control of poaching, and alternative explanations of state capacity and economic
incentives. Using the Institutional Analysis and Design approach to explore formal
institutional rules as proxy measures shows that where Communal Sharing and
Authority Ranking models predominate, rhino poaching is controlled. Conversely,
where Market Pricing relational models predominate, rhino poaching is not
controlled. Furthermore, state capacity and economic incentives show no
relationship with the control of poaching or its absence.
What is the relationship between relational models and the control of rhino
poaching? In this chapter, I survey the universe of states with wild rhino populations to
identify how relational models relate to the control of rhino poaching. Using institutional
rules as proxy variables for relational models, I show that states where non-market price
relational models predominate have successfully controlled rhino poaching. Conversely,
states where a market-priced model predominates have not controlled poaching. I also
demonstrate that alternative arguments regarding state capacity and economic incentives
are insufficient for explaining this variance. I conclude by identifying cases for further
investigation in order to identify causal mechanisms.
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Relational models theory holds that individuals construct environments in one of
four ways: using a market price model based on a ratio between things, or using one of
three non-market priced models that reference a community, an authority, and an
equality. From these models, objects attain fungible values in the market-priced model, or
incomparable values in a non-market priced model. These models therefore lead to two
distinct patterns of behavior when individuals engage in trade-off reasoning. When an
individual uses a market priced model, he or she experiences a routine trade-off
comparing two fungible values. However, when an individual uses a non-market priced
model, he or she experiences a taboo trade-off, activating the sacred value protection
model (SVPM) that leads to moral outrage and moral cleansing.
To assess what relational model most individuals use in a community with rhino,
this research considers formal institutions as proxy variables. I operationalize these
institutional measures by considering whether rhino exist on public or privately-held
land, property rights associated with rhino, and formal penalties for mis-use of rhino as
wildlife resources. Assuming that these formal rules reflect the rules in use within a
country with wild rhino, this enables a classification of institutional arrangements within
countries, and by extension, the predominant relational model.
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Assumptions
This analysis makes four assumptions regarding the control of rhino poaching.
First, I assume that publically reported data regarding incidents of rhino poaching is
valid. This assumption is justified because of a rhino’s size and significance. As
endangered megafauna, rhino populations are routinely monitored at the level of
individual animals. Moreover, a poached rhino results in a carcass weighing between
4,000 and 8,000 pounds, generating an easily detectable signature. Finally, while it is
likely that some poaching incidents go unreported or undiscovered, such incidents are
random and not systematic, unlikely to significantly alter broad assessment and
inferences.
Second, I assume that formal rules represent the rules-in-use individuals use to
make decisions. 141 The macro-level analysis of this chapter justifies this simplifying
assumption, as does my initial purpose of exploring correlation between relational models
and the control of poaching. However, any causal claims will require closer analysis and
confirmation of this assumption.
Third, I assume institutions guiding individual decision-making are static and
distinguishable from the individuals from actors. I justify this assumption by limiting the
time frame of this institutional analysis to 2006, just before the outbreak of the current
rhino crisis. In reality, these institutions are dynamically responding to individual
decisions, and thus co-constituted and changing over time. However, the short time frame
of interest to this research justifies treating them as exogenous.
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Similarly, I make a fourth assumption that an exogenous shock occurred in the
global market for rhino horn sometime around 2007, and was responsible for the
subsequent 100-fold increase in the price of rhino horn. After an initial period of intense
poaching beginning in the 1960s, rhino “poaching essentially came to a halt in the early
1990s when concerted international action . . . resulted in decisive political moves to end
national rhino horn consumption” that left “all major markets dormant.” 142 For the next
two decades, the price of rhino horn remained stable at approximately $800 to 1,500 USD
per kilogram. 143 By 2008, this price rapidly increased to approximately $100,000 USD
per kilogram. 144 Extant research attributes this increase to an economic bubble
manipulated by criminal syndicates who control the illicit global market, but the cause of
that lies beyond the scope of this research. 145
These assumptions regarding the validity of public records regarding rhino
poaching, the similarity of rules-in-form and rules-in-use, the distinguishability of
structures from agents, and the exogenous shock to the global rhino horn market enable
an examination of the relationship between the control of poaching and predominate
relational models in rhino range states.
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Outcome Variable: The Control of Rhino Poaching
The outcome variable for this analysis is the control of rhino poaching. This
analysis utilizes Muth and Bowe (1998)’s definition of poaching as “any act that
intentionally contravenes the laws and regulations established to protect wild, renewable
resources.” 146 This includes both illegal harvesting of resources and actions like selling,
purchasing, transporting, possessing, and using resources that contravenes a law. Thus
poaching requires intentionality, excluding unintended violations of resource laws like a
“hunter who mistakenly shoots a hen pheasant in a rooster only area.” 147 From this, rhino
poaching is the illegal harvesting of resources from a rhino, particularly rhino horn, and
deliberate actions associated with that harvesting such as purchases and sales,
transportation, possession, and use of rhino horn.
Poaching is controlled when incidents of poaching are sporadic, punished, and do
not threaten the survival of a population. The control of poaching is a form of social
control, an organized response to deviant acts. 148 This approach follows the classical
conceptualization of control, including both external influences and individual norm
internalization. 149
This conceptual definition of social control guides operationalizing the control of
poaching. As a form of criminal activity, some level of poaching will always be possible.
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However, if poaching is controlled, it must only occur in isolated, irregular incidents. If
poaching occurs routinely, it cannot be considered deviant, and therefore falls outside the
concept of social control. When poaching does occur, poachers should face some form of
accountability. Otherwise, the element of social control pertaining to an organized
response is not present. Finally, such sporadic acts should not threaten the survival of the
resource population. If any of these elements are missing, the poaching is not controlled.
The control of poaching is a categorical dichotomous variable, either controlled or
not controlled. The unit of analysis is a country during a calendar year. Poaching is
controlled when during that year, incidents of poaching are sporadic, punished, and do
not threaten the survival of a population. As a threshold for measurement, this analysis
additionally requires that some poaching occur in order for it to be controlled. In order to
determine when individuals choose not to poach, it is necessary to rule out the possibility
that poaching simply did not occur, and that individuals never confronted a decision of
whether to poach or not poach. Put another way, the response aspect of social control
requires that some action occur necessitating a response. Therefore, the complete absence
of poaching in a case is not necessarily evidence that poaching has been controlled, and
cases where no poaching occurred whatsoever will not be considered in this research.

Explanatory Variable: Relational Models
The explanatory variable for this analysis is the predominate relational model
used by individuals in resource system with rhino. A relational model is a mode of
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relationship that structures social action, thought, and motivation. 150 From relational
models theory, there are four potential modes: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority
Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP). The absence of a
relationship can further be considered as a fifth possible null mode. These relational
models are fundamental, innate, and universal. 151
A relational model predominates when a preponderance of individuals within a
group utilize the same relational model in a given context. In this research, a relational
model predominates when a greater number of people living in a community with rhino
share one relational model than do those who do not. 152
Predominant relational model is a categorical nominal variable with five potential
values: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM),
Market Pricing (MP), and Null (NR). 153154 The unit of analysis is a human population
living in a state with wild rhino.
A predominate Communal Sharing model occurs when a preponderance of
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to what they
have in common. This means that individuals treat rhino as common to the community,
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and identify other community members in part by a shared collective responsibility
towards rhino.
A predominate Authority Ranking model occurs when a preponderance of
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to a transitive
asymmetrical differences. This means that individuals associate rhino with a common
hierarchical authority, where one’s position within the hierarchy determines one’s
responsibilities, privileges, and choices associated with rhino conservation.
A predominate Equality Matching model occurs when a preponderance of
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to an additive
imbalance. This means that individuals associate rhino with some relationship of
balanced equality, involving concepts such as in-kind reciprocity for interacting with
rhino, or matched contributions of the same kind and quantity. This relational model is
commonly seen in relationships such as a modern Western marriage or voters in a
pluralistic democracy. However, it is difficult to operationalize in the context of
conservation, so this discussion will omit further reference to it.
A predominate Market Pricing model occurs when a preponderance of individuals
living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to a ratio. In this
situation, individuals associate rhino with a single universal utility metric, typically
money. In essence, rhino become commodities, and people evaluate rhino through ratios
of comparison to other commodities, including money, time, utility, or substitutes.
Finally, a predominate Null model occurs when a preponderance of individuals
living in a community with wild rhino have no relationship to rhino. In these situations,
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individuals act without regard to any social relationship, and take no account of rhino in
their lives whatsoever.

General Hypotheses
•

If prior to 2006, most people within a country construct rhino using a

Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational model, then poaching will be
controlled following the shock to global rhino horn markets.
•

If prior to 2006, most people within a country construct rhino using a

Market Priced relational model, then poaching will not be controlled following the shock
to global rhino horn markets.

Institutional Rules as Proxy Measures
To gauge the predominant relational model, this research considers institutional
rules as proxy variables. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework established the critical role of institutions in understanding collective action
regarding resources. 155 This use of institutional rules as proxy variables follows Ostrom’s
approach for classifying institutions that structure individual decision-making. 156
In the context of rhino conservation, variance in relational models appears in three
forms of institutional rules. First, boundary rules determine the type of land where rhino
155
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exist. Rhino can exist on land publically owned land or land held by an authority figure,
suggesting a Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational model respectively.
Alternatively, rhino can exist on privately held land, suggesting a Market Pricing
relational model. This variable is operationalized by whether rhino live on public or
private lands. If rules allow rhino to exist on private lands, then the entire system allows
for private possession of rhino, even if some rhino continue to live on public land.
Second, choice rules determine property rights regarding rhino, ranging from
exclusive public ownership to complete private ownership. Property rights held
exclusively by a public actor indicate a Communal Sharing relational model, while
property rights that vary with one’s position in a hierarchy suggest an Authority Ranking
relational model. Private property rights, such as the right of an individual to buy or sell a
rhino, indicate a Market Pricing relational model. This variable is operationalized by
whether private ownership of rhino and rhino parts is legally prohibited or authorized.
Conservatorship rights or landowner privilege, where the state retains theoretical legal
ownership but private parties are permitted to purchase rights to economically profit from
rhino (to include hunting them), are a form of private property rights and indicate a
Market Priced relational model.
Third, pay-off rules determine the penalties for misconduct involving rhino.
Severe penalties, such as shoot-to-kill authority conferred on rangers, mandatory
imprisonment, or asset forfeiture, ostracize offenders in sweeping responses to
transgressions. These are consistent with Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking
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relational models. 157 Penalties that vary with price, such as fines-in-lieu of imprisonment
or minor fines, indicate Market Pricing relational models. This variable is operationalized
by the legal penalty for rhino poaching.

Table 3.1: Proxy Variables for Relational Models
Communal Sharing or
Authority Ranking
Relational Model

Proxy Variable
Boundary Rules:
Where do rhino live?
Choice Rules:
What property rights
exist regarding rhino?

Payoff Rules:
What is the penalty
for misuse of a rhino?

157

Market Pricing
Relational Model

Rhino live on public lands.

Rhino live on private lands.

Private ownership of rhino
prohibited.

• Private ownership of rhino
permitted
• Rhino and/or hunting rights can
be bought and sold
• Includes conservatorship and
landowners privilege

•
•
•
•

• Light penalties
• Fines in lieu of prison
• Minor fines

Severe penalties
No jail in lieu of prison
Asset forfeiture
Shoot to kill

Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 130–32.

66

Causal Mechanisms
This research argues that moral outrage and moral cleansing mechanisms explain
the hypothesized relationship between relational models and the control of rhino
poaching. Moral outrage:
has cognitive, affective, and behavioral components: lower thresholds for making
harsh dispositional attributions to norm violators; anger, contempt, and even
disgust toward violators; and enthusiastic support for both norm enforcement
(punishing violators) and metanorm enforcement (punishing those who shirk the
burdensome chore of punishing deviants). 158
Moral cleansing holds that every individual deciding whether to poach or not poach “will
engage in symbolic acts of moral cleansing designed to reaffirm their solidarity with the
moral community,” even if they merely contemplate the decision of poaching. 159
Applied to rhino poaching decisions, this theory predicts that when individuals
living with rhino construct the rhino using a non-Market Pricing relational model, they
will respond to rhino poaching with harsh dispositional attributions to rhino poachers,
anger and disgust toward rhino poachers, and support for both punishing rhino poachers
and punishing those who do not punish rhino poachers. Moreover, such individuals will
engage in symbolic acts to reaffirm their solidarity with the community or authority
associated with rhino. These moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms will be absent in
cases where individuals construct rhino using the Market Pricing relational model.
This chapter’s focus on formal institutional rules will not identify whether such
mechanisms are present in the universe of rhino range states. Rather, detailed case studies
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in subsequent chapters will investigate this application of the sacred value protection
model.

Alternative Arguments: Coercive State Capacity and Economic Incentives
This chapter also considers the two primary alternative arguments for the control
of poaching through coercive state capacity and economic incentives. The state capacity
argument explains that poaching is controlled when a coercive actor, typically the police,
has sufficient capacity to deter criminal activity such as poaching. Skocpol (1985) argued
that a state’s deployment of financial resources is the best single measure of state
capacity. 160 While there are many ways to measure state capacity, the state’s total
financial resources best capture the full potential of the state to act. For instance, a state
may decide to lower taxes, and thereby diminishing its actual revenue. However, such a
state could equally decide to raise taxes and increase that revenue. Thus by considering
the amount of financial resources a state possesses, one gets a fuller measure of what the
state is capable of.
I operationalize this state capacity with a continuous variable: the revenue of a
state in a given year. This value of this variable will expressed in US dollars in 2005.
This variable will enable the consideration of state capacity as an alternative argument to
a social theory of the control of poaching.
The economic incentive argument explains that poaching is controlled when
individuals have sufficient economic incentives not to poach. Given that rhino horn
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currently sells for approximately $100,000 USD per kilogram on illicit markets, it is
difficult to conceive of a non-poaching use of the rhino that would yield similar
profits. 161 However, one could argue that if non-poaching uses of rhino generates
sufficient economic income to meet some level of need, then this could explain why
individuals choose not to poach. To consider this alternative argument, I will consider the
economic impact of tourism, measured by the number of international tourists per year
and the amount of money generated by tourism per year. This will enable me to consider
the alternative argument of economic incentives to control poaching.

Data
This analysis predominately utilizes archival data from the Rhino Resource
Center, a non-governmental knowledge center that works with the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to collect, preserve, and catalogue data on all species
of rhinoceros. 162 I obtained data regarding the control of poaching from reports submitted
to the Conferences of Parties to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species, as well as news articles for more recent poaching events. To analyze institutional
rules, I utilized archived reports from both governmental, intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations describing rhino conservation programs. To analyze state
capacity and ecotourism, I utilize data from the World Bank’s World Development
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Indicators for 2005. 163 In order to gauge conditions prior to the 2007 shock in rhino horn
price, I utilize data on institutional rules, state capacity, and tourism from 2005.

Results and Discussion
Institutional structures indicative of non-market priced relational models strongly
correlate with the successful control of poaching. All five states that controlled rhino
poaching had institutional structures consistent with a communal sharing or authority
ranking relational model. Conversely, all nine states that failed to control rhino poaching
had institutional structures consistent with market pricing. No pattern was observed
between levels of state capacity and the control of poaching, while states with the
strongest tourism sectors were the least successful at controlling poaching.

Control of Poaching
In 2005, seventeen states had confirmed populations of wild rhino. 164 In the
decade since, poaching occurred but has been effectively controlled in five countries:
Botswana, Nepal, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. At the same time, rhino have been
poached to extirpation in four countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malaysia,
Mozambique, and Vietnam), with uncontrolled poaching in five remaining countries:
India, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Three countries are excluded from
this analysis either because no poaching occurred there since the 2007 crisis (Indonesia
163
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and Uganda) or because rhino were killed through snares, thus precluding an assessment
of intentionality (Malawi). 165 While it is possible that individuals in these countries
choose not to poach in this time period, it is also possible that individuals never
entertained the decision to poach, and therefore these cases are excluded from my
exploration of why individuals choose not to poach rhino.

165

Interestingly, both Indonesia and Uganda may exhibit Null relational models. In Indonesia, rhino only
exist in remote uninhabited areas and rarely observed even by conservationists, suggesting a geographic
cause for the complete absence of poaching. Uganda only began reintroducing wild rhino in 2005,
precluding any assessment of its institutions prior to 2005.
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Table 3.2: Rhino Poached Per Country, 2006- 2015
Country
Botswana
DR Congo

2006

India

2007

2008

2009

0

1

7

Kenya
Malaysia

0

Mozambique

2010

1

2

0

0

5

6

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

5

6

1

5

0

5

0

9

5

1

0

2
4

0

215

175

Namibia
Nepal
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Vietnam
Zambia

0

4
3

3

2

1

22

30

48

68

004

Zimbabwe
1
8
64
9
2
5
3
2
0
Legend: E= White indicates poaching controlled; Red indicates not controlled, E indicates Extirpation.
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Table 1.1: Control of Poaching 2006-2015
Poaching Controlled (n=5)

Poaching Not Controlled (n=9)

• Botswana
• Nepal
• Swaziland
• Tanzania
• Zambia

• Democratic Republic of Congo (extirpated 2010)
• India
• Kenya
• Malaysia (extirpated 2011)
• Mozambique (extirpated 2013)
• Namibia
• South Africa
• Vietnam (extirpated 2010)
• Zimbabwe
Excluded from analysis: Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda.

Relational Model
Relational model is highly correlated with the control of poaching. All five states
that controlled rhino poaching had institutional structures indicative of a non-market
priced relational model, either communal sharing (Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia) or
authority ranking (Botswana and Swaziland). Institutions within these states show
marked similarities in some respects. Each kept rhino populations in publically protected
areas, often guarded by a strong public actor such as the army. Choice rules regarding
restricted private property rights, use and consumption, including bans on rhino hunting.
Payoff rules carried severe penalties for misuse, including mandatory imprisonment for
poaching. When fines were specified, they often included both forfeiture of resources
plus sliding penalties such as a fine worth ten times the exchanged value of the poached
animal. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, a single charismatic actor dominated the
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conservation program and the broader societal context, indicative of an authority ranking
structure.
The nine states that did not control rhino poaching all had institutional structures
indicative of a market pricing relational model. Boundary and position rules allowed
significant involvement of private actors, either through outright ownership of rhino (as
in South Africa) or through conservatorship granted to private landowners (Kenya,
Namibia, Zimbabwe). In most cases, the majority of the country’s rhino populations
existed on privately held protected areas. Choice rules afforded significant private
property rights, either through ownership or through landholder privileges. Pay-off rules
had light penalties for misuse, often allowing bail and fines in lieu of imprisonment.
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Table 3.3: Relational Models and the Control of Poaching
Poaching Controlled
Communal Sharing
Relational Model
Authority Ranking
Relational Model

Market Pricing
Relational Model

•
•
•
•
•

Nepal
Tanzania
Zambia
Botswana
Swaziland

Poaching Not Controlled
None
None
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

None

DR Congo (extirpation)
India
Kenya
Malaysia (extirpation)
Mozambique (extirpation)
Namibia
South Africa
Vietnam (extirpation)
Zimbabwe

State Capacity and Tourism
State capacity and ecotourism shows little to no correlation with the control of
poaching. Some states with low state capacity controlled poaching (Nepal, Swaziland,
and Zambia), while others did not (DRC, Mozambique, and Namibia). Interestingly,
states with high coercive capacity such as India, South Africa, Malaysia, and Kenya did
not control poaching, although Botswana did. Similarly, states with the highest tourism
rates were the least successful in controlling poaching: of the four states with the highest
numbers of tourists and highest revenues from tourism, two had the highest numbers of
rhino poached anywhere and two experienced extirpation. Some states with lower
amounts of tourists and tourist revenues controlled poaching (Nepal and Swaziland),
while others did not (DRC and Mozambique).
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Table 1.2: State Capacity, Measured by Government Revenue and GDP in 2005
Poaching
Controlled
High State
Capacity (revenue > US$
20 billion)

Low State
Capacity
(revenue < US$ 5
billion)

None

•
•
•
•
•

Botswana
Tanzania
Nepal
Zambia
Swaziland

Poaching Not
Controlled
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
(extirpation)
•
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
(extirpation)

India
South Africa
Malaysia
Vietnam
Kenya
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
DR Congo

Table 1.3: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Visitors in 2005
Poaching
Controlled
High Economic
Incentives
(Tourism >
1,000,000 visitors)

Low Economic
Incentives (Tourism <
1,000,000 visitors)

•

Botswana

•
•
•
•

Tanzania
Nepal
Zambia
Swaziland

76

Poaching Not
Controlled
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
(extirpation)
•
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
(extirpation)

India
South Africa
Malaysia
Vietnam
Kenya
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
DR Congo

Chart 1.4: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Receipts in 2005
Poaching
Poaching Not
Controlled
Controlled
High Economic
Incentives
(Receipts > US$
400 mil.)

Low Economic
Incentives (Receipts <
US$ 400 mil.)

•
•
•

Botswana
Tanzania
Zambia

•
•

Nepal
Swaziland

•
(extirpation)
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
•
•
(extirpation)
•
•
(extirpation)

Malaysia
South Africa
India
Vietnam
Kenya
Namibia
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
DR Congo

Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed the universe of states with wild rhino populations prior
to the current crisis in rhino poaching. Of these, five states successfully controlled
poaching. All five states that successfully controlled poached featured institutional rules
indicating Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models, including strong
public sector conservation, bans on private property rights associated with rhino, and
severe penalties for rhino poaching.
During the same time period, nine states failed to control rhino poaching,
including four states whose populations were extirpated. All nine of these states featured
institutional rules indicative of Market Pricing relational models, operationalized by the
privatization of rhino conservation and light and/or fungible penalties for rhino poaching.
Admittedly, this analysis makes a significant assumption that may not be valid:
formal institutional rules reflect the rules in use by individuals living near rhino. Many of
the states in question possess weak institutions, which may have questionable influence
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on actors within them. At the same time, potential confirmation bias during my
qualitative assessment could affect the reliability of my analysis of relational models at
the national level. I mitigated this potential bias by operationalizing the models through
formal rules regarding legal boundaries, choices, and penalties, consistent with Ostrom’s
well-established methodology for institutional analysis and development.
I also employed well-established and objective measures to evaluate alternative
hypotheses. State capacity and tourism provided no clear correlation with the control of
poaching, except that states with the highest capacity and levels of tourism were the least
effective in controlling poaching.
These results provide tentative support for relational models theory and the sacred
value protection model to explain the control of poaching. They further suggest that stateor market-centric theories of conservation are insufficient for explaining the control of
poaching, and may actually work against achieving such control.
To look beyond these correlations and investigate causal mechanisms, I next turn
to detailed case studies of Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa. These cases represent
ideal types of all three relational models, while also exemplifying variance in state
capacity and ecotourism. Nepal and Swaziland have institutional structures indicative of
predominately Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking relational models respectively;
they also have comparatively weak state capacity and levels of tourism. In contrast, South
African rhino conservation exemplifies a predominately Market Priced relational model.
It is also one of the strongest and wealthiest of all rhino range states. These cases will
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enable a closer look at why poor, weak countries have successfully controlled rhino
poaching.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MANIFESTATIONS OF RELATIONAL MODELS
This chapter explores whether individuals in countries with rhinos actually
manifest different relational models relative to rhino conservation, as suggested by
analysis of institutional rules in Chapter Three. After reviewing literature that
describes how relational models manifest in individual behavior, I present and
justify a research design to appraise relational models among actors in rhino
conservation in three countries: Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa. I find that in
each case, a majority of respondents manifested a similar relational model:
Communal Sharing in Nepal, Authority Ranking in Swaziland, and Market Pricing
in South Africa. I detail observations of these manifestations, then conclude by
addressing this research’s limitations and implications.
In countries with wild rhinos, do individuals actually think about rhinos in
different ways? More technically, do individuals use distinct psychological schemata
when thinking about rhinos, as relational models theory would predict? Does the social
construction of rhinos vary?
In Chapter Two, I used relational models theory and the sacred value protection
model to show how this variance might occur, and how such variance could explain a
country’s ability to control rhino poaching. In Chapter Three, I used institutional rules as
proxy measures to show that non-Market Pricing relational models correlate with the
effective control of rhino poaching, and Market Pricing with a lack of control of
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poaching. This analysis hinged on an assumption that rules-in-form reflect rules-in-use,
and that formal rules correspond to the actual behavior in a rhino conservation setting. In
this chapter, I delve deeper into three cases in order to test these assumptions and
investigate actual manifestations of relational models. 166 Exploring the cases of Nepal,
Swaziland, and South Africa, I demonstrate that Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking,
and Market Pricing relational models do manifest empirically in each case. Moreover,
within each case, a vast majority of conservationists employ the same relational model,
thus validating assumptions made in Chapter Three’s institutional analysis and
strengthening the argument for a social theory of conservation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review literature on manifestations of
relational models to establish observable implications of each model. Next, I present and
justify my research design, including assumptions, methods, and case selection. I then
present my findings, demonstrating that each in case, a majority of conservationists
manifest the same relational model. In Nepal, most actors utilize a Communal Sharing
model, whereas in Swaziland, most actors utilize an Authority Ranking model and in
South Africa, a Market Pricing model. I conclude by discussing my findings, their
limitations, and implications.
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In seeking to test assumptions, I follow Robert H. Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 14. This is contrary to the position argued by Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

81

Manifestations of Relational Models
Relational models theory posits that people use four fundamental and innate
relational structures to coordinate social activity. 167 The four models are Communal
Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing. These models are
psychological schemata that manifest across social domains, appearing in things, choices,
orientations, and judgments. In the following section, I summarize Fiske (1991)’s catalog
of key distinguishing features of Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Market
Pricing. 168 I first discuss the general manifestation of the relational model, then specify
observable implications of that model in the specific context of rhino conservation. As in
Chapter Three, I omit discussion of Equality Matching as this model rarely appears in the
empirical context of rhino conservation. 169

Communal Sharing: Relations Based on What People Share
The Communal Sharing model occurs when individuals structure interactions by
what they share. Resources are held in common without individual shares or portions.
Individuals contribute what they have in fulfillment of collective responsibility. Objects
hold metonymic significance to other people of shared identity, including natal
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orientations towards land. Time is understood in long form, emphasizing tradition,
eternity, and perpetuity. Decision making features unity and consensus, and social
influences prize conformity and mutuality. Groups express kinship and common identity,
privileging close relationships and intimacy. Moral judgments accent altruism and
protection, including traditional legitimation. Misfortune is interpreted as either
stigmatizing or as solidarity, and conflict orients against out groups and equivalent others.
These various manifestations all emphasize the commonality central to the Communal
Sharing relational model.
In the context of rhino conservation, a Communal Sharing relational model should
construct rhinos in reference to a community. Rhinos will be a common resource and a
collective responsibility of all members of the community. Rhinos will hold metonymic
significance to community members, with sacred status linking individuals to others in
the community. Rhino habitat will have natal associations, perpetuating traditions rooted
in history. Individuals will signal social conformity by outward modeling of support for
rhino conservation, linked to a common sense of kinship. Individuals will likewise
motivate action in rhino conservation by associations with close and enduring
relationships, such as children and parents. Rhinos will have traditional legitimation, and
conservation actions will feature altruism and generosity. Misfortune associated with
rhinos will be linked either to outsiders and outgroups, or connected to solidarity with
fellow community members.
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Authority Ranking: Relationships Based on Authoritative Hierarchy
The Authority Ranking relational model manifests in similar ways to Communal
Sharing, only instead of referencing relationships to a commonality, it is to a shared
hierarchy. As with Communal Sharing, objects associated with this model have
incomparable or sacred value.
In the domain of reciprocal exchange, superiors take first and inferiors second,
while superiors retain a pastoral responsibility to provide for inferiors and their
protection. In distributional aspects, those with higher rank get more, and lesser ranks get
less. Superiors likewise contribute more, often in noblesse oblige. Work allocations
privilege superiors, who control and direct more demanding work by subordinates.
Superiors endow objects with prestige and emblems of rank, limiting the ability of
inferiors to associate with objects. Superiors dominate land orientation. Time is likewise
structured according to rank, with temporal priority given to superiors. Decision making
reflects authoritative choices, transmitted through the hierarchy. Social obedience to
authority is expected and signaled. Groups organize around charismatic leaders, and
social identity is defined by rank and relationship to the hierarchy. Motivation rests on
power, but goes beyond mere coercion. 170 The moral judgments of superiors are deemed
legitimate and the source of heteronomy. Misfortunate is construed as a result of breaks
with a hierarchy, and such breaks elicit aggression and conflict. The Authority Ranking
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model features criteria denoting rank, dimensions marking precedence and demarcated
domains of authority.
In the context of rhino conservation, an Authority Ranking relational model
would manifest by referencing some common hierarchy. Hierarchical superiors within a
community determine conservation policy, including access to rhinos and utilization of
resources associated with rhinos. Superiors would bear a responsibility to provide for
rhino conservation, and make symbolic demonstrations of their fulfillment of that
responsibility while doing less of the arduous or menial labor associated therein.
Prestigious associations with rhinos would be reserved for superiors, with restrictions on
inferior members’ choices regarding rhinos. Land associated with rhinos would be
dominated by superiors in the hierarchy, potentially through personal dominions, fiefs, or
special reserves. Rhinos may be temporally associated with superiors, such as marking
changes in the hierarchy itself like the establishment of a new leader. Decisions regarding
rhino conservation would be made by fiat or decreed, transmitted through the hierarchy,
and obeyed by subordinates. Subordinates would socially signal deference and loyalty to
such decisions, and organize conservation activities hierarchically. Social identities
identify superiors with prerogative regarding rhino conservation, and inferiors with
servitude toward such prerogatives. Individuals would be motivated towards rhino
conservation by power and not merely coercion, morally associating superior’s decisions
with legitimacy. Challenges to these decisions will be viewed morally, and met with
aggression and conflict. In short, rhino conservation will be marked by reference to a
socially legitimate hierarchy.
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Market Pricing: Relationships Based on Ratios
A Market Pricing relational model organizes interaction by referencing ratios or
rates, usually through a utility measurement such as money. This model manifests in
reciprocal exchange and distribution in the form of proportional payments for
commodities, often through use of market prices. Contributions are made on the bases of
fixed ratios like a sales tax, or percentages such as tithing. Work is done for wages that
vary with time or output. Things have meaning as commodities, produced or purchased
for profit or maintained as capital or inventory. Products are developed and presented as
market considerations, and a property’s value is derived from its cost. Land is considered
as investments or capital, purchased for monetary appreciation, lease, rent, or means of
production. Time is viewed in terms of productivity and efficiency. Decisions are made
through markets, featuring considerations of supply, demand, expected utilities, and
cost/benefit analysis. Social influence is likewise through cost and benefit incentives,
with focuses on payments, bonuses, penalties, market manipulations, and references to
scarcity and time limitations. Groups are constituted as corporations, markets, commodity
associations, and firms. Social identity flows from one’s occupation or economic role,
and motivation is ascribed to achievement. Moral judgment is based on utilitarian criteria,
and misfortune explained as unacceptable costs relative to benefits. Aggression and
conflict are characterized by mercantilism, killing to protect markets or profits, and
rational strategies such as kill ratios. Key features of the Market Pricing model are what
entities may be bought and sold, what ratios of exchange are, and what counts as a cost or
benefit. Relationships are symbolically represented in economic terms, with emphasis on
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specialization and commodity exchange. These features share the Market Pricing
relational model’s common reference to ratios or rates.
In the context of rhino poaching, the Market Pricing relational model chiefly
manifests in economic terms. Rhinos would be treated as commodities, with conservation
framed as a function of market prices or utility. Individual participation and contributions
towards conservation would vary with what one had paid or received, and conservation
activity would be treated as wage work varying with time or output. The significance of
rhinos would lie in their ability to produce or be purchased for profit, capital, or
inventory. Messaging regarding rhinos would be presented in market considerations, and
the value of rhinos would be associated with their costs. Land for rhino habitats would be
treated as capital, either for expected appreciation, lease, rent, or as means of production.
Time associated with rhinos would be framed through efficiency and productivity.
Decisions regarding rhinos would be made by markets, referencing supply, demand,
utility, and cost/benefits. Social influence would be through cost/benefit incentives
associated with rhinos, particularly payments, bonuses, and fines; these will emphasize
scarcity and time limitations to encourage social action. Groups will constitute as
corporations, markets, commodity associations, and firms. Individuals will define their
roles in conservation in terms of occupation or economic role, drawing motivation from
achievement rhinos. Moral judgements associated with rhino conservation will emphasize
utilitarian criteria, attributing misfortunate to mismatches between costs and benefits.
Aggression and conflict involving rhino conservation will be characterized by
mercantilism, killing to protect markets and profit, and devising strategies based on kill
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ratios. In total, the Market Pricing relational model will manifest in rhino conservation in
economic behavior.

Research Design
To investigate what relational model an individual uses, researchers look at
individual actions in order to identify manifestations described in the preceding section.
In the initial presentation of relational models theory, Fiske identified the exploration of
“who uses which model in what domains, and when” as one of three major directions for
future research. 171 In the following section, I explore this direction.
I employ a methodological technique common to relational model research:
analysis of individual statements and behaviors, obtained through interviews and
observation. In essence, this technique consists of identifying respondents in structured
settings, either through experimental or field settings, and surveying respondents’
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to situations. Variants of this technique are
used to assess relational models as described by Haslam (2004). 172173 Whitehead’s (2000)
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ethnography of the Seltamen of New Guinea features similar methods, as did Goodnow’s
(1998) study of the organizational of housework work. 174 Tetlock, McGraw and Kristel
(2003) utilized both this method and relational models theory to explore the valuation of
objects, while Poulson (2000) did likewise to investigation interpersonal conflicts. 175
Haslam, Reichert and Fiske (2002) studied aberrant use of relational models among
persons with self-identified interpersonal problems. 176 This literature establishes the
credibility and validity of assessing relational models through observation and analysis of
individual statements and behavior. 177
Applying this method to identify what relational model manifests among users of
social-ecological systems featuring rhinoceros, I conduct a structured, focus comparison
of three cases. This approach involves applying standardized general questions to
multiple cases in order to make systematic comparisons and evaluation of findings.
George and Bennett (2005) identify three requirements and two characteristics of a
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structured, focused comparison. 178 First, the universe of cases to be studied must be
clearly delineated. In this dissertation, the universe is the control of rhino poaching since
2006, encompassing all 17 rhino range states. Of these states, I focus on three states
whose formal institutions suggest ideal type variance of relational models. The
prominence of community actors in Nepal suggests the Communal Sharing relational
model, while the prominence of the king in Swaziland’s formal rules suggests the
Authority Ranking model. Lastly, South Africa’s formal rules suggest a Market Pricing
relational model.
Second, there should be a well-defined research objective and appropriate
research strategy. In this chapter, the research objective is to identify if and how
relational models vary across the universe of cases, utilizing a research strategy common
to relational model research. Third, case studies should employ variables with
explanatory potential and policy implications. Relational models meet such criteria.
George and Bennett additionally note that research should be structured, as in carefully
developed to reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry, and
focused with a specific research objective in mind and appropriate to that objective. By
utilizing Fiske’s identified manifestations of relational models in individual behavior, this
chapter thus meets accepted standards for structure and focus.
I collected data for this chapter primarily through interviews, complemented by
observation. I employed semi-structured interviews (also known as non-scheduled
structured or focused interviews) as this technique’s median positioning on the spectrum

178
This technique is described in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67–72.

90

of interview control facilitates deeper exploration and understanding of the interview’s
topic. 179
I conducted interviews according to a single protocol, locating in an appendix to
this chapter. This protocol aimed to understand the social construction of a rhino in a
given locale, the dominant relational model used to construct rhino in a locale, the
institutional characteristics of communities regarding rhino poaching, how conservation
organizations manage poaching threats, and what lessons learned conservations have
discovered in their work with rhino.
I designed the protocol as an inverted funnel, beginning with an introduction and
context assessment, before moving into questions gauging the social construction and
relational model the participant used for rhino, institutions regarding rhino, the
participant’s experiences with rhino, and finally their assessment of rhino conservation.
All participants were asked the same questions in the same order, although I followed
individual answers in a conversational manner to thoroughly understand answers
provided while using probes to ensure I covered the correct material.
I utilized cluster sampling to select participants, focusing on the individuals with
some active role in rhino conservation. Such roles including professional conservationists
such as wardens, guards, veterinarians, and scientists, but also tangential roles such as
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concessionaires and volunteers. Each of these meets the categorical requirements of actor
in a social-ecological system. 180
Cluster sampling from actors within the rhino social-ecological system has two
additional advantages. First, it leverages the benefits of judgement sampling, where the
opinions of selected participants are important to the research itself. The actors in this
sample are precisely those identified by extant theory as the critical actors in poaching
outcomes. Second, cluster sampling actors in rhino conservations mitigates the risk of
selection bias in deviating from random selection. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994)
highlight the risk of bias towards high status individuals who are generally supportive of
government policy. 181 However, in this case, actors in rhino conservation could likewise
be assumed to be generally supportive of rhino conservation, viewing rhinos as
intrinsically worthy of conversation. Actors in rhino conservation all live and work near
dangerous animals, under pressure from equally dangerous poachers, and most of these
actors derive their income and living from such work. Given such vested interests in
rhino conservation, if even this cluster population shows significant relational model
variance regarding rhinos, then so should broader populations within countries with
rhinos.
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Results
In each of the three cases, a clear majority of respondents manifested a single
relational model. In Nepal and Swaziland, most respondents manifested a non-Market
Pricing relational model (Nepal, n = 31/35; Swaziland, n = 18/24), primarily Communal
Sharing in Nepal and Authority Ranking in Swaziland. In South Africa, most respondents
manifested a Market Pricing model (n = 28/32). This suggests that a single relational
model does predominate within each social-ecological system, that this predominate
relational model corresponds to the model suggested by the formal institutional rules, and
that this variance in relational models may explain why some countries have effectively
controlled poaching. In the follow section, I will detail participant responses to illustrate
how each relational model manifests in individual orientations towards rhino
conservation.
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Figure 4.1: Manifestations of Relational Models in Rhino Conservationists, by Country

Y axis: Number of Respondents Who Manifest a Particular Relational Model

Nepal: Manifestations of Communal Sharing
In Nepal, a vast majority of respondents described rhino conservation in terms of
their community. Most respondents metonymically linked rhinos to their national
identity, their community, and their family. In response to the question “Why are rhinos
important to you,” one participant characteristically exclaimed, “Because I’m Nepali!,”
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before describing rhino conservation of a function of the community’s “self-esteem” and
“how we see ourselves.”
Most Nepali respondents (n=31 of 35) manifested the Communal Sharing
relational model when describing rhino conservation. Four respondents (n= 4 of 35)
manifested a Market Pricing relational model.
Nepali respondents frequently linked rhino conservation to their children, thus
manifesting elements of kinship and unity in group constitution and long-term
orientations towards time. One participant, after explicitly stating that “rhinos are more
sacred to me than a cow, and I am a Hindu,” then explained, “rhinos were important to
my grandfather, and I want them to be important to my son.” Other respondents
expressed a sense of obligation to children, who are exposed to conservation themes in
school, and a desire to be seen by their children as fulfilling communal obligations to
contribute and work rhino conservation. One participant said that if he failed to contribute
to rhino conservation, he feared what his children would think of him. Other Nepali
respondents associated work in rhino conservation as a sign of education. One leader of a
volunteer anti-poaching unit said that after his children learned about rhinos in school, “I
came to know the importance of the rhino, [and] I joined” the anti-poaching patrol. These
responses indicate the social influence of conformity, mutual modeling, and imitation, as
well as intimacy motivation.
Most Nepali respondents described rhinos as inseparable from a common forest
landscape, indicating a communal orientation towards land associated with rhinos. One
participant said that even if tourism stopped, rhino conservation would remain important
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because he believed rhinos occupied a keystone role in the forest. He also noted that
rhino bring a sense of safety to the forest, which was striking because his father was
killed by a rhino in the forest. The participant described that death in language similar to
a tragic trade-off, indicating that both the lives of his father and the rhino were of
incomparable or sacred value. He stated that his father had inadvertently trespassed in the
rhino’s space, and that the rhino had a right to exist in the forest. Several respondents
described active participation in volunteer anti-poaching patrols, further indicating
communal orientations to contribution, work, and distribution. One participant described
his work in rhino conservation as “working for my nation, and for the pride of my
nation.” This association of rhinos with community also appeared in moral
manifestations.
Most Nepali respondents described transgressions against rhino conservation in
distinctly moral language. Many respondents expressed a deep sense of altruism and
selfless generosity towards rhinos, reporting a “duty to protect wildlife” from poachers.
In the domain of aggression and conflict, poachers were seen as outsiders who threatened
the community. One participant said that against poachers, conservationists “can’t win
with guns, [but] only with community. They are our eyes.” When discussing poaching,
several respondents displayed moral outrage, stating that “poachers should hang, even
beyond the law” that prohibits capital punishment. Others expressed a desire for
mandatory life imprisonment for rhino poachers, or in the words of respondent, the
punishment should be “as much as more.” Such moral language is consistent with
manifestations of the Communal Sharing relational model.
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Nepali respondents often explicitly disavowed the influence of state capacity or
economic incentives. Rather, both government officials and non-governmental officials
emphasized the critical role of communities. Several government officials stated that only
when the government turned to the community did anti-poaching become successful.
Likewise, a member of a volunteer anti-poaching unit proudly described catching a
government official who was poaching, and how his community group pressured the
government to deal with this official. Similarly, many respondents specifically said that
the value of the rhino lay beyond its impact on tourism. One respondent who worked in
ecotourism displayed moral outrage when asked to assess the economic value of a rhino,
flatly stating that “it cannot have a price. It is the source of the community’s wealth.” The
respondent continued that if ecotourism stopped, his business would likely fail, but he
believed the rhino would still be important to Nepal, as “this animal has a right to exist.”
He concluded his interview by emphasizing that “the world in the future must have rhinos
in it.” Similarly, a community leader expressed disgust for both economic assessments of
rhinos and efforts to incentivize conservation through tourism revenue. The leader
distinguished between conservationists “who work for money” versus those “who work
for the heart,” stating that while money was necessary for community development, “if
you pay money for conservation, you are forcing people to do what they should already
do.” This leader emphasized that “ten volunteers are better than 100 workers” when it
came to protecting the rhino.
In total, only four Nepali respondents manifested the Market Pricing relational
model; of these, one was a senior government official, one worked for an Western NGO,
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one worked in finance for a community NGO, and one led a community that was
disproportionally affluent compared to neighboring communities. Such responses provide
exceptions suggestive of a rule, indicating that rather than state capacity or economic
incentives, a significant majority of Nepali conservationists manifest a Communal
Sharing relational model in reference to rhino conservation.

Swaziland: Manifestations of Authority Ranking
In Swaziland, most respondents described rhino in terms of a common
hierarchical authority. The King of Swaziland, Mswati III, appeared prominently in every
participant’s response. In answer to the question, “Are rhino important to you,” one
employee of a Swazi national park replied, “Thumbs up for the King! Because of him, we
have rhinos in Swaziland.” King Mswati provides the transitive hierarchical authority that
anchors social constructions of rhino in Swaziland, indicating the Authority Ranking
relational model.
A clear majority of Swazi respondents (n=18 of 24) manifested non-Market
Pricing relational models when describing rhinos. Most respondents manifested the
Authority Ranking relational model (n=13), while some also manifested the Communal
Sharing model (n=5). However, even the respondents who manifested Communal
Sharing still prominently featured discussions of King Mswati.
Most Swazi respondents described rhino conservation in deference to the King.
For instance, after stating that it was important to conserve rhino, one government official
explained, “the monarch has said we must preserve the animals.” Another participant
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flatly ascribed the importance of rhino conservation to the King’s “decision that we must
preserve the rhino.” Likewise, another respondent explained that “our king has a lot of
pride” in rhino, as did a participant who explained that rhinos are important “because we
are Swazi, and we live in a kingdom.” One participant described rhinos as “the King’s
children.” These responses indicate the central role of King Mswati as a hierarchical
authority figure who pastorally directs and controls how Swazis understand rhino
conservation, a hallmark of Authority Ranking manifestations.
As most Swazis consider rhinos part of the sovereign realm of their King,
obedience to and compliance with rhino conservation relies heavily on social influence.
Respondents often described the importance of setting a good example regarding rhino
conservation. One participant said “if we do not protect the rhino, our children will see us
differently,” while another stated that “if you poach, people see you differently” and
“look on the poacher’s community differently.” Many respondents expressed gratitude to
the king for Swaziland’s success in rhino conservation. In each of these responses, the
central concern was maintaining one’s standing in the eyes of the king. This focus on
social conformity with the hierarchy exemplifies the Authority Ranking relational model.
Consistent with both Authority Ranking and Communal Sharing relational
models, many Swazi respondents manifested moral outrage and moral cleansing when
describing transgressions against rhino conservation. Respondents favored heavily
punishing both poachers as norm violators and accessories to poaching as metanorm
violators. One respondent said that “if someone poaches, take away their rights. Even
someone who offers a helping hand” to poachers.” Another flatly declared that poachers
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should “rot in jail,” and that maximum punishments should be considered minimums.
One respondent approvingly noted the legal equivalence between killing a person and
killing a rhino. Beyond such expressions of moral outrage, respondents also displayed
moral cleansing in discussion reactions to rhino poaching. One respondent said that in
order to be released from jail, poachers “must show that you’ve changed” to the Swazi
community. Another participant said that punishment for poaching should include reeducation, similar to a different respondent’s belief that poachers should be punished by
being forced to work with rhino conservation in order to better appreciate the animals.
These responses are characteristic manifestations of non-Market Pricing relational
models.
A minority of Swazi respondents (n= 6 of 24) manifested Market Pricing
relational models while describing rhino conservation. Of these, four respondents were
elites with significant ties to international actors. This suggests a higher incidence of
Market Pricing relational models among respondents closer to the international level of
conservation. Interestingly, several respondents displayed moral outrage while discussing
Swaziland’s institutionalized outsourcing of rhino conservation and national parks
administration to a private corporation. One decried turning conservation into “a family
business” and obtaining private gains from a national resource. Another noted that the
corporation was straining its relationship with the Swazi people by abusing the
conservation authority of the King. The respondent attributed this to the killing of alleged
poachers by rangers employed by the private corporation. The respondent was not
outraged by the death of the poachers, but rather that they were killed by private
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employees and not by officers of the king. These reactions are consistent with taboo
trade-offs described by non-Market Pricing relational models. In total, Authority Ranking
appeared as the predominant relational model among Swazi rhino conservationists.

South Africa: Manifestations of Market Pricing
In South Africa, most respondents described rhinos in reference to a market
system. The universal metric of money dominated South Africa discussions of rhinos,
particularly its fantastically lucrative illicit price. When asked to explain why he believed
rhinos were important, one respondent answered, “I’ll be honest, when I see a white
rhino, I see a [expletive] cow with a million dollars on its forehead.” A clear majority of
South Africa respondents (n=28 of 32) manifested the Market Pricing relational model
when discussing rhino conservation.
South Africa respondents overwhelming related rhino conservation to the price of
rhino horn. Many respondents explained that rhino were valuable because of their horns,
stating that “people say its worth a lot of money.” Others attempted to relate the value of
the horn to income generated by ecotourism, saying “we have to get people to recognize
the rhino will bring them more money if it is alive than if it is dead.” Another explained
his calculated cost per year of protecting a rhino from poaching, noting that it was
economically cheaper for him to minimize anti-poaching outlays, accept a sustainable
rate of poaching, and replenish his rhino stock through public auctions. Similarly, one
participant compared the cost of maintaining rhino to that alternative species like kudu,
and said that other species brought in more tourist revenue. Still another wondered about
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the effect that a rhino poaching incident would have bed rates in local tourist facilities, or
on the ability of community members to tithe from disposable income derived from
tourism. In one telling incident, a police officer at a checkpoint near a protected area
stated that “rhino horn is very valuable” while he illegally confiscated sundry items I had
in my luggage. 182 These varied responses all share a common employment of calculations
involving fungible values, efficiencies, costs and benefit incentives, economics decisionmaking, and treating rhino conservation as a means to increasing economic ends.
Consistent with this fundamentally economic outlook, few respondents
manifested moral outrage or moral cleansing in discussions of rhinos. Some respondents
rationally legitimized abandonment of rhino conservation by comparing its costs relative
to that of alternative species. Many called for policy changes to legalize the trade in rhino
horn on the basis of its lucrative profit potential, stating that it was wrong that only
criminals could derive financial benefits from conservation given the illicit price for horn.
Several noted that the price of rhino conservation was simply too high, and that
“extinction is overrated.” Multiple respondents asked what the actual effect was of losing
the dodo and quagga, and suggested that if rhinos went extinct, “tourists will still come.”
Several respondents flatly denied that rhino conservation was important, stating, “I’ll be
honest, rhinos do not matter to me,” “I do not care about rhinos,” and expressing belief
that conserving rhinos was more trouble than it was worth. When respondents did state
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preferences for violent responses to rhino poaching, it was expressed in the language of
protecting property against thieves.
A minority of respondents (n=4 of 32) manifested the Communal Sharing
relational model in contrast to Market Pricing. Of these, all four emphasized obligations
to their children as driving their participation in conservation, and each displayed moral
outrage and cleansing that was absent in responses from other participants. One described
several intensely violent encounters with poaching, and openly discussed psychological
stresses created by participating in South African rhino conservation. These responses
provide exceptions that confirm the overwhelming predominance of the Market Pricing
relational model among South African rhino conservationists.

Discussion
These findings demonstrate that the social construction of rhinos does vary among
rhino range states, that how individuals think about rhinos varies in observable ways.
More significantly, individuals in different countries manifest different relational models
when discussing rhino conservation within their countries.
Among conservationists in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, a majority of
respondents in each case manifested a similar relational model. In Nepal, most
conservationists manifested a Communal Sharing relational model, whereas in
Swaziland, most conservationists manifested an Authority Ranking model. In South
Africa, most conservationists manifested a Market Pricing model.
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This analysis is somewhat limited by the non-random sampling of participants.
However, the use of cluster-sampling to focus on actively participants in rhino
conservation mitigates this limitation, as such respondents should logically have a greater
interest in successful rhino conservation. That this population itself shows variance in the
social construction of rhinos suggests that such variance continues in broader populations
beyond the conservationists themselves.
A more significant limitation lies in the time lag between these observations in
2015 and the global shock in rhino horn price in 2006. As such, it is possible that the
identified relational models have endogenously responded to circumstances within each
case since the global shock, and may not correspond to relational models manifesting
within these cases prior to the crisis. However, the correlation between relational models
inferred from formal institutional rules as of 2005 and those identified in respondents in
2015 suggests that such models have remained stable within each case.
The respective predominance of Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and
Equality Matching within Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa suggests that institutional
rules are valid proxy measures for relational models in Chapter 3. Moreover, it lends
support to the hypothesized relationship between relational models and the effective
control of poaching, suggesting that moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms have
facilitated comparatively weak and poor countries like Nepal and Swaziland to succeed
where stronger, more developed countries like South Africa have failed. To further
investigate the causal influence of relational models on the control of poaching, I next
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explore the specific responses of Nepal, Swaziland and South Africa to rhino poaching
since 2006.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYTIC NARRATIVE OF NEPAL’S CONTROL OF
POACHING
Why do Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking relational models facilitate the
control of rhino poaching? According to the Sacred Value Protection Model, when
individuals relate to rhino using non-Market Priced relational models, poaching will
elicit moral outrage and cleansing behaviors. In this chapter, I employ analytic
narratives to demonstrate that such moral outrage and cleansing provide
mechanisms for controlling rhino poaching. At critical junctures in Nepal’s
responses to rhino poaching, moral outrage and cleansing facilitated effective
responses to rhino poaching. I also demonstrate that at such junctions, state
capacity and economic incentives were at best irrelevant, and may even encourage
further poaching. I conclude by summarizing my findings and addressing their
limitations and implications.
When individuals think about rhino in different ways, how does it affect the
control of poaching? Does thinking about rhino in terms of one’s community or a
common authority help communities control rhino poaching? Does predominant usage of
Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models facilitate the effective control
of rhino poaching? According to relational models theory and the sacred value protection
model, when individuals use non-Market Pricing relational models to relate to rhino, then
poaching rhino becomes a taboo trade-off and elicits moral outrage and cleansing. These
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moral reactions to poaching provide critical mechanisms that weak and poor communities
can leverage to control poaching of fantastically lucrative wildlife.
To understand these mechanisms connecting structural factors like relational
models and outcomes like the control of poaching, I employ analytic narratives to
understand how Nepal has effectively controlled rhino poaching. In tracing Nepal’s
response to rhino poaching since 2006, I demonstrate that moral outrage and moral
cleansing existed at critical junctures in this country’s effective control of rhino poaching.
I also establish that at such critical junctures, the role of state capacity and economic
incentives were at best irrelevant and at worst, worked against the control of poaching.
This chapter proceeds as follows. 183 First, I present and justify the methodology
of analytic narratives to evaluate the sacred value protection model, and the case selection
of Nepal for evaluating this model. Second, I identify a model of the control rhino
poaching based on sacred value protection, including general observable implications.
Third, I examine an analytic narrative of Nepal’s response to rhino poaching since 2006,
moving from the country’s history of rhino conservation to their attempts to control the
current epidemic, followed by analysis of the model’s explanatory ability for the case. I
conclude by discussing my findings, their limitations, and implications.
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I organized this chapter along the argument presented by Margaret Levi’s “Conscription: The Price of
Citizenship” in Analytic Narratives, eds. Robert Bates et al (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
109-147. Levi explores social explanations for failures in a rational choice model through three cases; this
was similar to my own analysis, especially in its tangential connection to relational models theory through
the concept of blocked exchanges. Levi references Philip E. Tetlock, Randall Peterson and Jennifer
Lerner’s “Revising the Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates,” in The
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Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 25-51.
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Modeling Rhino Poaching
Rhino conservation programs chiefly vary on a dimension of public versus private
authority. In public programs, rhino conservation is oriented to and anchored in a public
interest, either a communal identity or a common hierarchy. In contrast, private interests
motivate private conservation programs, and conservation is seen as good business.
Conceptually, these programs can be modeled as social-ecological systems
(SES). 184 SES analysis seeks to explain institutional interactions and outcomes in
resource systems. Interactions are activities and processes such as harvesting, poaching
(illegal harvesting), information sharing, conflicts, and monitoring and evaluation
activities. Outcomes occur in three forms: social performance measures such as
efficiency, equity, and accountability, ecological performance measures such as
overharvesting, resiliency, biodiversity, and sustainability, and externalities to other SES.
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Figure 2.1: A Social-Ecological System

Source: McGinnais and Ostrom 2014 185
The SES framework explains these interactions and outcomes as functions of the
interaction of four subsystems of variables: Resource Systems, Resource Units,
Governance Systems, and Actors. Resource Systems variables describe ecological
attributes relevant to rhino conservation, such as physical boundaries around rhino
populations, human constructed facilities associated with rhino conservation, and forage
available to rhinos. Resource Units variables describe the rhino themselves, including
both their number of units (population), replacement rate (births and natural deaths), and
economic value (both licit and illicit). Governance Systems variables comprise the social
institutions associated with rhino conservation, from government organizations to
property-rights systems to monitoring and sanctioning rules. Actors variables describe the
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109

agents who live in rhino conservation settings, including socioeconomic attributes,
location, norms and social capital, and technology available.
The SES approach was developed to enable systematic analysis of complex and
diverse resource management situations. While this framework enables detailed
examination of individual situations, its explanatory power derives from leveraging
generalization about such diversity, thereby enabling cross-case comparison, analysis,
and the typological theorizing advocated by George and Bennett (2005) and identified by
Ostrom and Cox (2010) as “consonant with the paradigm of adaptive natural resource
management.” 186 As Ostrom said in her 2009 Nobel laureate lecture, “We need to ask
how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting,
trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more
effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.” 187 The SES framework
enables exploration of such outcomes through generalization amid complex diversity.
To model rhino poaching using the SES framework, the focal action situation
(outcome of interest) is the control of poaching, an ecological performance measure.
Rhino poaching is controlled when it is rare, punished when it does occur, and does not
threaten the survival of a given rhino population.
Dominant literature examining conservation outcomes offers two explanations for
why the control of poaching should occur. First, the economic value of rhino harvesting
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can fall, reducing the benefits available to actors from illegal harvesting. 188 The reduction
could occur in two ways. First, the market price for poached rhino horn could diminish,
thereby reducing the incentive to poach. Alternatively, the economic value of not
harvesting could increase, such as through ecotourism revenue sharing. This latter
approach anchors many contemporary prescriptions for conservation through ecotourism.
The second explanation for the control of poaching is increasing the capacity of
guards and monitors, either through alteration to governance systems like government
organizations or through increasing technologies available to guards. 189 According to this
explanation, individuals choose not to poach when the costs of poaching become
sufficiently high. This approach is at the heart of green militarization, and accompanies
calls for shoot to kill policies to combat rhino poaching.
Both of these approaches are theoretically and empirically problematic.
Theoretically, it is difficult to resolve collective action problems associated with
distributing costs and benefits inherent in both explanations. At an individual level, an
individual always stands to exclusively gain the benefits from poaching, while poaching's
costs will likely be distributed amongst the individual's community. Moreover, the
empirical reality of today's fantastically lucrative price for rhino horn makes it difficult
for any cost benefit calculation to yield a situation in which it is profitable not to poach.
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See David W. Bromley, “Economic Dimensions of Community-Based Conservation,” in Natural
Connections: Perspectives in Community Based Conservation, ed. Western, David and R. Michael Wright
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A social explanation leverages psychology to encompass these explanations while
moving beyond them to more accurately explain micro-foundations found in reality. The
control of poaching is an interaction of three key actors: poachers, community members
who live near rhino populations, and authorities who sanction activities associated with
rhino conservation. Whether poaching is controlled— that is, whether it is rare, punished,
and does not threaten the survival of a given rhino population— is a function these
interactions. Poachers seek to illegally harvest rhino horn. To do so, poachers must travel
from and through a community to access rhino habitat, and return to populated areas
afterwards in order to traffick the poached horn. To control this, authorities must either
closely guard the rhinos themselves, or intercept poachers moving through communities
to rhinos. Continuous guarding is difficult with wild rhinos, although this is precisely
what Kenyan authorities have done with the world's last three northern white rhinos.
Otherwise, authorities must intercept poachers moving within, from, and to populated
areas. Their ability to do so hinges on the residents of those populated areas.
This chapter's analysis considers the critical juncture for determining whether
poaching occurs as individual decisions to participate in poaching, to acquiesce to such
poaching, or to stop it. This focus employs the concept of a critical juncture of a brief
phase of "institutional flux," when individual choices have lasting impacts that close off
alternative options and generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes that are
difficult to alter. 190 Moreover, this focus grounds an analysis of poaching in the microfoundations of the individual level. 191
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At this critical juncture is the decision to poach rhinos. In its narrowest sense, this
is the decision to wound or kill a rhino in order to harvest its horn. However, in reality, to
poach is to engage in the illegal harvesting of a natural resource. 192 As such, this critical
juncture is actually the decision to participate in the illegal harvesting of rhinos.
The term poacher encompasses any actor engaged in the illegal harvesting of
rhino horn. Milliken and Shaw (2012) typologize poachers into five levels, based on
analysis by South Africa’s National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit. Level 5 poachers are
international buyers and consumers of rhino horn, typically in China and Vietnam. Level
4 poachers are the international couriers, buyers, and exporters who acquire rhino horn
from countries with rhinos, then traffick and sell it in demand markets. Level 3 poachers
are the national couriers, buyers and exporters who transport rhino horn from local
sources to international poachers. Level 2 poachers at the local level organize the illegal
harvesting of rhino horn, which is actually collected by Level 1 poachers who physically
hunt and harvest the horn.
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Figure 5.1. Levels of Organized Crime in Rhino Poaching

Source: Milliken and Shaw 2012, p. 78. 193
Benefits accrued from poaching vary with each level of the poaching syndicate,
ranging from approximately USD 10,000 per rhino for a level 1 poacher to nearly USD 1
million per rhino at its final sale. These actors’ interests are primarily commercial:
maximize profits while minimizing costs. 194 They also seek to avoid legal authorities to
avoid sanction, and if caught, will seek first to pay bribes, then fines to evade
punishment. While Level 1 poachers gain the least from poaching, they are paradoxically
the critical actor in determining whether a rhino is poached.
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The strategy employed by a Level 1 poacher is to travel to a location with rhinos,
whose small ranges make them relatively easy to find. 195 Once there, the poacher can
approach a rhino, whose notoriously poor vision enables poachers to approach closely.
The poacher shoots the rhino to disable it, and then utilizes tools as crude as a hacksaw to
remove the rhino's horn. This process takes approximately 10 minutes, after which the
poacher returns to a populated area with easily concealable rhino horn weighing
approximately 4 kilograms per horn. 196 During the poacher’s movements, he must evade
guards monitoring the protected area. Once returned to the protected area, the Level 1
poacher must now meet with a Level 2 poacher to exchange the poached horn for money.
The Level 1 poacher now returns home flush with cash he or she must launder into licit
income.
Meanwhile, the Level 2 poacher consolidates horn locally and arranges to transfer
it to a Level 3 poacher, typically located near air or sea ports. The Level 2 poacher must
evade monitoring by police near the protected area, and the Level 3 poacher must evade
monitoring by customs and border control personnel. The Level 3 poacher trafficks the
horn to a Level 4 poacher, who exports the horn across national boundaries to finally
connect with the Level 5 poacher, who purchases the horn in its demand market. While
195
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individuals vary in their specific illegal activity within the transnational criminal
syndicate, each individual chooses to intentionally contravene laws regarding rhino.
Poachers' preferences are straightforwardly economic: they prefer to maximize
their profit and minimize costs. 197 At most basic level, these individuals choose to poach.
In reality, these decisions are made in an institutional context in the presence of other
actors. As such, to understand the critical juncture of whether an individual chooses to
poach a rhino, two other key actors are relevant: authorities who guard and monitor rhino
populations and activities associated with them, and community members who live near
both rhino populations and poachers. One could simplistically argue the final decision to
poach a rhino is simple a matter of the poacher faced with a rhino. In reality, poachers
depart from and return to communities after engaging in poaching. During that time
period, poachers may encounter authorities, and almost certainly will encounter
community members who are aware of the poaching. The poacher seeks to illegally
harvest rhino, authorities guard and monitor rhino populations and associated activities,
and community members watch. The interaction of these three groups determines
whether poaching will be controlled or uncontrolled.
Authorities who monitor activities associated with rhinos consist of security
forces at the protected areas where rhinos live, police forces in surrounding areas and in
areas where individuals live, including poachers, customs and border security personnel
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If a potential poacher’s utility function includes social variables such as community reputation, this
would further diminish the likelihood that the poacher would choose to poach if the community’s
predominant relational model is Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking. Assuming that the poacher’s
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at ports of embarkation in and out of a country, and permit authorities for activities such
as entering protected areas, hunting, and legal exportation.
Ceteris paribus, these authorities generally prefer to enforce existing rules,
especially those associated with their formal authority. Assuming that such authorities
chiefly desire to retain their authority, the very act of illegally harvesting a rhino
undermines that authority. However, under standard rational choice assumptions, these
authorities will also engage in cost benefit reasoning regarding how they guard and
monitor interactions with rhinos. The benefits of sanctioning illegal activities regarding
rhinos are constant, in the form of salaries. However, direct costs vary, and likely
increase as poachers increase activities. Park security forces must provide for fuel for
park vehicles and equipment, and rations for park employees and livestock. Police
likewise incur operating expenses, plus costs associated with cultivating and maintaining
intelligence networks like informants. Regulators have administrative overhead, often in
challenging field conditions. For governments with limited state capacity in the
development countries home to wild rhino, the direct costs of enforcement are expensive.
Authorities may not prefer to enforce rules if such enforcement comes at
significant costs. Direct costs associated with rule enforcement include those associated
with monitoring rhino populations and boundaries of protected areas, cultivating and
maintaining intelligence and informant networks, and screening individuals moving
through and near protected areas. Indirect costs include opportunity costs of rejected
bribes and side payments, and social censure from policing members of one's own

117

community. Exponential increases in the illicit price of rhino horn particularly increase
the opportunity cost of rejecting bribes and corruption.
As public authorities, these actors also have indirect costs to their community
relations. To varying degrees, public authorities may be accountable to the communities
poachers come from and return to. Enforcing anti-poaching laws may cost authorities
popular support; in some countries, park rangers are not even commissioned as law
enforcement, and therefore not legally permitted to shoot a would-be poacher without
committing manslaughter or even murder. Moreover, enforcing conservation laws against
poachers may trigger backlash from communities with poachers, particularly if poachers
enjoy community support. This Robin Hood effect can further increase the indirect costs
to public authorities for sanctioning poachers. Finally, corruption is endemic in every
rhino range state. Public authorities that sanction rhino poaching incur opportunity costs
of forgone bribes and side payments associated with poaching. Adding this factors to the
potential for shirking in all principle-agent relations yields a situation where authorities
may or may not choose to sanction rhino poaching. This ambiguous role of authorities
points to the critical actors in determining whether rhino poaching is controlled or
unchecked: members of communities adjacent to protected areas and home to poachers
themselves.
Community members have tangential interests to rhino conservation. Some may
derive income from conservation activities, either directly through employment in
ecotourism or indirectly through revenue sharing associated with rhino conservation.
Others may simply live near rhino, which creates vulnerability to human-wildlife conflict
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and potential damage to human life and property. 198 Finally, community members may
have social relationships with other actors, both poachers and public authorities.
Maintaining such relationships is a potential interest. Finally, community members may
face direct and indirect costs associated with poaching. For direct costs, community
members may provide taxes and public revenues to finance anti-poaching enforcement.
For indirect costs, community members may face losses in revenue from ecotourism due
to poaching, as well as potentially bodily harm to poachers and public authorities with
whom community members have relationships.
When a community member encounters a poacher, the community member faces
a choice. He or she can ignore the poaching, and do nothing. Second, the community
member can inform public authorities. Third, the community member can pressure public
authorities to sanction the poacher, or sanction the poacher him/herself. 199

Equilibrium Outcome 1: When a Market Pricing Relational Model Predominates
If all three actors approach this action situation from an economic perspective, as
when a market pricing relational model predominates in reference to rhinos, and given
the fantastically lucrative contemporary price of rhino horn, we should expect an
equilibrium outcome of increasing poaching and the absence of poaching control.
Poachers will weigh costs and benefits, and determine that the profit opportunity of
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approximately $10,000 USD for ten minutes of relatively easy work is worthwhile. 200
Moreover, such profit margins provide plenty of money available to bribe any
sanctioning authorities encountered.
Such sanctioning authorities may also deem it profitable to not sanction poaching
activity, or to not expend excessive public resources to protect them. In order to protect
every rhino all the time, authorities would need to significantly increase the direct costs
of enforcement action. Meanwhile, such work could risk alienating community members,
upon whose support and resources authorities depend.
If these community members view the action situation through economic lenses,
those who derive economic benefits from not poaching (e.g. ecotourism) and from public
authorities such as revenue sharing may prefer that poachers do not poach, or that
authorities sanction poaching. However, this would only occur if such benefits exceed the
windfall profits to be gained through poaching a product valued at prices approaching
USD 100,000 per kilogram. For such an outcome to occur, the economic benefits accrued
from sustainable uses like ecotourism would have to pay extraordinarily well.
However, if community members do not economically gain from not-poaching, or
if such gains do not outweigh fantastic potential gains from poaching, then community
members will likely do nothing in relation to poachers. This produces the policy
equilibrium of uncontrolled poaching.
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The extraordinary price commanded by rhino horn on global markets bears stressing here. If the price
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is central to this analysis.
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Equilibrium Outcome 2: When a Non-Market Pricing Relational Model Predominates
Incorporating relational models theory into the model illuminates a different
potential policy outcome. According to relational models theory, individuals who
confront the action situation through strictly economic decision-making are employing
the market priced relational model, and engaging in routine trade-off reasoning. The costs
and benefits of poaching and not poaching, sanctioning and not sanctioning, ignoring or
informing will be weighed as fungible options, which tend to lead poachers to poach
while authorities and the community looks away.
However, when individuals construct rhinos using a non-market pricing schemata,
either communal sharing or authority ranking, the policy equilibrium becomes the control
of poaching. Poachers will still choose to poach, as some individuals will always engage
in taboo behavior. However, public authorities employing the non-market pricing
schemata will view poaching as a taboo-trade off, and are more likely to expend
resources towards guarding and monitoring regardless of costs. Still, while such attitudes
may make for more effective anti-poaching activities, the basic challenge of constantly
protecting such vulnerable animals means that committed authorities may not be
sufficient to control rhino poaching.
However, if community members employ a non-market pricing relational
schemata to construct rhinos, then rhino poaching becomes a taboo tradeoff. Economic
incentivizes and cost-benefit calculations will not only fail to incentivize community
members to ignore poaching, such measures will paradoxically incentivize community
members to instead report poaching activities to public authorities (moral outrage) and
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pressure such authorities to sanction rhino poachers (moral cleansing). The act of
sanctioning poachers will become legitimizing; authorities who do so will enjoy public
support, and those who fail to do so will face public pressure against them. In effect, the
community itself becomes an extension of the guard and monitor functions formally
assigned to public authorities. When poachers poach, they trigger moral outrage and
cleansing in the community. Community members report poachers to authorities, and
pressure authorities to sanction poachers. Ultimately, the control of poaching— or even
zero poaching— becomes the new policy equilibrium.

Observable Implications of Equilibrium Outcomes
These two scenarios produce two general scenarios. In the first, where the
predominate relational model among community member Market Pricing, the following
interactions occurs:
1. Poachers engage in the illegal harvest of rhino horn.
2. Most community members who encounter poachers ignore the poaching.
3. Authorities either:
a. Lack sufficient capacity to protect rhinos always and everywhere.
b. Ineffectively guard and monitor rhino, or ignore what poaching activity
they do monitor.
c. Do not sanction poachers.

As a result, poaching is not controlled.
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Conversely, when community members predominately employ a non-Market
Pricing relational model, the following interactions occur:
1. Poachers engage in the illegal harvest of rhino horn.
2. Community members witness poaching, triggering a taboo-tradeoff. As a result,
they:
a. Express moral outrage, thus inform public authorities of poaching and
strengthening the monitoring capacity of such.
b. Seek moral cleansing, thus pressuring public authorities to sanction
rhino poachers.
3. Authorities:
a. Augment capacity with information gained from moral cleansing from
community members.
b. Respond to pressure generated by moral outrage from community
members.
c. Sanction poachers.

As a result, poaching incidents decline and the poaching is eventually controlled.
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From these scenarios, this model yields the following observable implications:
1. As the price of rhino horn increases, poaching will increase.

Where a Market Pricing relational model predominates,
2. As poaching increases, community members will ignore increased poaching
levels rather than report poachers or pressure authorities.
3. As poaching increases, public authorities may increase guard and monitor
capabilities, but will not significantly increase sanction activities.

Conversely, in countries where a non-Market Pricing (Communal Sharing or Authority
Ranking) relational model predominates:
4. As the price of rhino horn increases, community members experience poaching
as a taboo trade-off.
5. As poaching occurs, community members will express moral outrage at the
poaching activity, and report it to authorities.
6. Community members will pressure authorities to sanction rhino poaching as a
form of moral cleansing.

Both to distinguish moral mechanisms in this model from economic incentives, and
because theoretically, moral mechanisms should be most active when persons do not
construct rhino through Market Pricing relational models:
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4. The community members who express moral outrage and cleansing will not
economically benefit from rhino conservation.
5. Conversely, community members who economically benefit from rhino
conservation may ignore poaching, or seek economic alternatives like rhino horn
legalization rather than moral responses.

Finally, in order to distinguish moral mechanisms from mere coercion from authorities:
6. Sanction by public authorities should be temporally preceded by pressure from
community members with no economic incentive for doing so.

The following analytic narrative explores how Nepal successfully controlled rhino
poaching. In Nepal, a Communal Sharing relational model predominates and most people
associate rhino with their community. Using archival data and contemporary accounts,
this narrative describes how Nepal responded to the 2006 shock in the price of rhino
horn, focusing on the interactions of the model's key groups and the role of moral
mechanisms, before concluding with analysis of the model's utility. This analysis
explores how the moral mechanisms of outrage and cleansing have led to a policy
equilibrium of controlled rhino poaching.

Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching
Historically, Nepal has struggled to control rhino poaching. From an initial
population in the early 1950s of approximately 800 rhino, within twenty years, Nepal’s
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rhino population fell to between 60 and 80 animals. In 1973, the government of Nepal
began deliberate efforts to conserve rhino through the creation of Nepal’s first national
park, Chitwan. However, this program has consistently struggled to control poaching.
Given Nepal's weak system of government and endemic problems with both trafficking
and corruption, poaching remained an ongoing threat to Nepali rhino, and was increasing
in the years leading up to the current global crisis. Yet just a few years into the poaching
pandemic, Nepal has become the most effective country in the world at controlling rhino
poaching.

History
Nepal has a checkered history of rhino conservation. Public authorities across
various regimes have sought to protect rhinos, beginning with the Rana kings and
continuing to today's post-conflict unity government. A series of institutional adaptions
sought to balance public authority with community consent and support. However, the
effectiveness of these arrangements has ebbed and flowed, and some level of rhino
poaching persisted until well into the current global crisis.
Nepal is home to the greater one-horned rhinoceros Rhinoceros unicornis,
sometimes known as the Indian rhinoceros. The third largest land mammal, this species is
the second largest of the five rhino species. 201 Its horn is comparatively smaller than
African varieties due to the absence of a posterior horn, although it has historically
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commanded a higher price. 202 Possessing folds of hardened skin resembling armored
plates, this species was the first to be successfully imported live into Europe, and
dominates visual constructions of rhino in many Western cultures. 203 Behaviorally, the
Indian rhino is generally docile, inhabiting surprisingly small-ranges relative to other
megafauna. 204 In Nepal, rhinos live in a low-lying jungle forest known as the Terai, with
ready access to vegetation needed for rhinos’ prodigious appetites. 205 Rhinos also
frequent wallowing sites, making them relatively easy to locate for poachers. 206 These
animals historically inhabited the floodplains throughout south Asia, but since the 20th
century have been essentially reduced to populations in two countries, India and
Nepal. 207208
The commercial hunting of Indian rhino is a similarly historic practice. While
rhino horn is often associated with traditional Chinese medicine, Nepal itself has a long
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cultural history of consuming rhino products (horn, hide, hooves, organs, even urine). 209
Perhaps due to the cultural significance of rhino products, in 1846, the first ruler from
Nepal’s Rana dynasty declared the rhino a Royal Animal, thus reserving the right to hunt
rhinos to members of Nepal’s royal family. 210 At the time, poaching was punishable by
death. 211 Moreover, mosquito-borne malaria discouraged human settlements near rhino
habitats. 212 The twin protections of royal prerogative and malaria kept Nepalese rhino
populations stable until the 1950s.
However, as the 1951 fall of the Rana dynasty removed royal protections from the
Terai landscape, malarial eradication enabled human settlement of rhino habitat.
Financed by foreign aid, the human population in the Terai increased from 36,000 in
1950 to 100,000 in 1960. 213 Within increased human contact came increased poaching. In
this same time period, rhino populations plummeted from approximately 1,000 animals to
less than 300. 214 Despite a government-compelled relocation of nearly all human
settlements north the Rapti River, human and rhino populations continued to boom and
bust respectively. By 1968, rhino population fell to between 81 and 108 animals, while
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by 1971, human population reached 185,000. 215 As rhino populations neared extinction,
the government acted.
Initial efforts to protect Nepal’s rhino created physical boundaries and established
guard and monitor roles for public actors. Spurred in part by a World Wildlife Fund
project initiated in 1967 to protect rhinos near Chitwan, in 1973 Nepal’s government
gazetted the habitat of the last remaining rhino as Chitwan National Park, commissioning
a Gainda Gasti or rhino patrol from the Forest Department to guard rhino populations. 216
This created a physical barrier around Nepal’s rhinos, and charged a public authority with
guarding them. In 1976, the Royal Nepal Army assumed guard responsibilities from the
rhino patrol, solidifying the exercise of public authority in protecting rhinos. These
actions effectively halted rhino poaching, as from 1975 until 1983, only three rhinos were
poached in Nepal.
In the 1980s, Nepal expanded position rules by institutionalizing monitors for its
rhino population, and increased security forces stationed in the park. A partnership
between the Nepalese government and the American Smithsonian Institution’s National
Zoological Park led to the 1982 creation of Nepal’s first conservation nongovernmental
organization, the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation (KMTNC, now known
as the National Trust for Nature Conservation or NTNC). 217 In conjuncture with a newly
created Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation within the Forest
215
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Ministry, KMTNC’s monitors generated scientific data about rhinos and the park, leading
to the formation of an epistemic community within the government’s public authority.
However, this increase in information about Nepal’s rhinos accompanied a return of
rhino poaching. By 1988, an Army battalion deployed to protect Chitwan National Park,
yet poaching continued to rise uncontrolled. 218 As human populations outside the park
also grew, Nepalese rhino conservationists shifted focus from governance within the park
to communities that lay beyond it.
In the 1990s, coincident to a democratic transition ending Nepal’s absolute
monarchy, Nepal expanded the role of community members in rhino conservation. This
effort centered on the pioneering creation of buffer zones adjacent to Chitwan National
Park, creating a multiple layers of protected areas around the core of the park. The
concept of buffer zones originated in UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme in
1971, and community forest development accelerated since the Panchayat Forest Rules of
1978 and the Community Forestry program of 1980. 219

220

In 1988, USAID funded a

native tree nursery created on private land owned by a KMTNC employee, creating an
environment for community members to harvest valuable thatch grass. 221 Coincidently,
this same environment expanded habitat for wildlife like rhinos. The next year, this effort
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expanded onto government-owned land managed by user group committees. By 1993,
national legislation officially sanctioned these community-managed buffer-zone forests,
and in 1998, responsibility for these zones transferred from Nepal’s Department of
Forestry to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC). 222
These institutions were replicated in additional protected areas created for rhinos in 1986
at Bardia National Park and in 2000 at the Royal Sukla Phanta wildlife reserve. 223
Buffer zones created positions for community members to involve themselves in
governance of rhino conservation. However, they aimed to do more, explicitly anchored
in the logic of sustainable development and accomplishing conservation outcomes
through generating benefits to local communities. 224 In the 1990s, Nepal’s buffer zones
did generate indirect benefits from rhino conservation, namely by protecting cropland and
flood control. 225 However, direct economic benefits from such zones were small, slow to
materialize, and narrowly distributed. 226 Throughout this period of expanding
community involvement in rhino conservation, rhino poaching increased. As benefits
from conservation failed to materialize, Maoist insurgents ignited a civil war in 1996.
For the next ten years, Nepal experienced escalating violent conflict. As the
government struggled to maintain control, Army security forces withdrew from guard
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roles in protected areas, and public authorities diverted resources away from rhino
conservation. For instance, after the government declared a state of emergency in
November 2001, the Army shuttered 24 guard posts at Chitwan National Park while it
withdrew soldiers for assignment elsewhere. 227 As the insurgency progressed, rhino
poaching increased. For over a decade prior to 1996, Nepal lost approximately five rhinos
per year to poaching. This doubled for the next two years, and by 2002, close to 40 rhino
per year were lost to poaching. By 2005, over a hundred rhinos were lost, leading experts
to conclude that “Nepal probably had the worst rhino poaching of any country in the
world” due to the insurgency’s effect on security. 228
At the same time, conservationists continued to bemoan the lack of
economic development associated with rhino conservation. Several studies documented
the lack of direct economic benefits reaching community members from rhino
conservations. 229 Economists and conservationists continued to call for the “creation of
alternative economic opportunities locally, so as to deter poachers from poaching.” 230 By
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2006, Nepal’s rhino conservation was characterized by weak security measures, high
poverty, and the worst poaching rates in the world.
Thus Nepal’s conservation history at the start of the current crisis was mixed.
Rhino poaching was an established pattern of interaction. For the previous five decades,
public authorities had consistently but ineffectively sought to control rhino poaching,
including innovative institutional adaptations like assigning the Army guard and monitor
roles, enacting strict choice and pay-off laws into legislation, and the pioneering practice
of buffer zone communities. Yet by 2006, these authorities were distracted by an
insurgency and constrained by limited resources, and ultimately ineffective at controlling
poaching amid the insurgency.
Community members faced physical and economic insecurity, even while
increasing participation in rhino conservation. According to capacity- or economic-based
expectations about conservation, Nepal should have been hard hit by the global shock in
the price of rhino horn. However, few community members had ever associated rhino
conservation with economic development. Rather, rhinos became coincident to healthy
forests and community life, and associated with community empowerment and
governance.

Nepal's Response to the Epidemic
Like many countries, Nepal initially experienced an increase in rhino poaching in
the first years after the price of rhino horn increased. However, vigilante action by
community members precipitated a wave of policy reforms targeting rhino poachers,
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including crackdowns against complicit government officials. By 2010, rhino poaching in
Nepal had effectively stopped, and since then, Nepal has gone from the world’s worst
country for controlling rhino poaching to the world’s best.
During the first four years of the poaching epidemic, rhino poaching continued in
Nepal. From 2006 until 2010, Nepal lost over 13 rhinos on average per year. 231 232 This
demonstrates that as with other range states, Nepalese poachers responded to global price
shock and continued to poach. Contemporary reports on rhino conservation from that
time period underscore that in the first years of the global crisis, many conservationists
assumed that because of Nepal’s demonstrated inability to control rhino poaching when
the price of rhino horn was low, Nepalese rhino were in great danger as the global price
skyrocketed and transnational criminal activity intensified. 233
The start of the crisis coincided with the resolution of Nepal’s civil war. In April
2006, Nepal’s king abdicated and reinstated Parliament, prompting Maoist rebels to
declare a three-month truce. Yet instead of reaping a conservation-dividend from the end
of fighting, initial government actions instead exposed deep corruption and complicity
with rhino poaching. In May 2006, after security forces killed a rhino poacher in Chitwan
National Park, the government arrested park officials for homicide, including the park’s
231

Esmond Bradley Martin and Chryssee Martin, “Enhanced Community Support Reduces Rhino Poaching
in Nepal,” Pachyderm 48 (December 2010): 49–50.
232
Although official records indicate only three rhinos were poached in 2007, this is at best an anomalous
year. Moreover, that same year, over 67 rhinos were discovered missing from Bardia National Park. This
discovery, plus continued poaching in subsequent years, suggests that more than three rhinos were poached
in 2007. Deepak Acharya, ed., “Rhino Numbers Severely Depleted in Bardia,” Conservation Watch-Nepal
1, no. 2 (September 20, 2007).
233

Martin and Martin, “Insurgency and Poverty: Recipe for Rhino Poaching in Nepal”; Ukesh Raj Bhuju,
Ravi Sharma Aryal, and Prakash Aryal, “Report on the Facts and Issues on Poaching of Mega Species and
Illegal Trade in Their Parts in Nepal” (Kathmandu: Transparency International Nepal, October 2009), 52.

134

chief warden and chief of anti-poaching. A newly appointed replacement warden soon
issued Nepal’s lightest possible sentence for poaching to a major rhino horn trader.
Nepal’s cabinet ordered 13 poachers released from jail that August, and two additional
poachers released in September. 234 These actions demonstrate at best ineffective
government responses to rhino poaching, if not outright collaboration with poachers.
Tragically, in September 24, 2006, a helicopter chartered by WWF-Nepal crashed
in northeast Nepal, killing 24 people. Among those killed were leading conservationists,
including Nepal’s Forest Minister, several World Wildlife Fund (WWF) employees
including nearly its entire Nepali leadership and its country director for Britain, the
Finnish charge d’affairs, and two USAID staff. 235 Since 1967, WWF had been the major
international NGO supporting wildlife conservation in Nepal. Beyond the organizational
impact of losing these key personnel, this event garnered significant public attention in
Nepal and the global conservation epistemic community.
Nepal’s civil war ended in November 2006 with the signing of a Comprehensive
Peace Accord. 236 Soon after, community members began mobilizing through public
demonstrations about rhino poaching, and calling for the government to control rhino
poaching. In December 2006, a student movement in Kathmandu delivered a petition
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with more than 100,000 signatures to the Forest Ministry, urging the government to stem
poaching. 237 This action is consistent with the public disassociation described as moral
cleansing. By early 2007, civil society groups from the buffer zone regions around
Chitwan National Park were pressuring the government to dismiss homicide charges
against the jailed officials from the previous May, and media reports criticized the light
sentencing of the rhino horn trader that followed. 238 These actions demonstrate the desire
for punishment described by moral outrage.
Throughout 2007, public authorities began taking steps to improve rhino
protection as pressure from community members mounted. In March 2007, the
government withdrew its homicide case against the Chitwan park leadership, and arrested
a trading ring of Level 2 poachers in Kathmandu, including a Nepali soldier who was
supplying ammunition. 239 By mid-2007, the government reestablished 22 security posts
in Chitwan National Park, and allocated a special budget of USD 57,423 for Army
operations within national parks. 240
While public authorities scaled up guard activities, community members also
increased interactions mobilizing public engagement aimed at controlling rhino poaching.
A public-private partnership between the Nepali government’s DNPWC and WWFNepal launched Operational Unicornis, a nationwide program to increase political
commitment for rhino conservation. A similar partnership between the DNPWC, WWF237
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Nepal, the formerly-named KMNTC now known as the National Trust for Nature
Conservation (NTNC), the Zoological Society of London, and the UK Darwin Initiative
began a law-enforcement monitoring system developed by the Wildlife Conservation
Society (WCS), known as MIST. 241 In August 2007, international and Nepali NGOs
launched the Empowering People for Rhino Conservation (EPRC) project in five buffer
zone communities adjacent to Chitwan National Park, including Conservation WatchNepal, a news service publishing information about rhino and other wildlife
conservation. 242 By September 2007, this newsletter was publicizing information about a
recently butchered rhino, which it characterized as “cruel,” “brutal,” and “pathetic,” and
describing the complicity of government authorities in condoning this practice. 243 Later
that month, Conservation-Watch Nepal reported that 67 rhinos had gone missing from
Bardia National Park’s official counts, presumably lost to poaching. 244 Student activism
among community members also increased. The EPRC project began organizing rhino
clubs in high schools near areas with high poaching, and an October 2007 student rally
near Chitwan centered on the slogan, “Save rhino, it saves us.” 245 Students even began
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organizing volunteer anti-poaching patrols in communities adjacent to protected areas. 246
Beyond schools, the EPRC also began hosting conservation summits between park
leaders and buffer zone village development councils. 247 These actions demonstrate
increasing involvement and activism from community members to counter rhino
poaching.
As public authorities slowly increased guarding and monitoring activities
throughout 2007, rhino poaching continued. In September 2007, two Level 2 poachers
were arrested outside Chitwan National Park, and in October 2007, a Level 3 poacher
was arrested near Kathmandu. 248 Community members appeared at public forums to
denounce both poaching and the government’s ineffective responses to it, including those
who had reported their own relatives for poaching. Despite these arrests, government
efforts to address poaching remained sluggish and focused on repairing and reoccupying
previously abandoned posts within parks. 249 Security positions would not be fully
occupied until 2009. 250 As the government acted slowly, Level 1 poachers continued to
kill rhinos, including a rhino calf in Bardia National Park in December 2007. 251

246

Martin, Martin, and Vigne, “Recent Political Disturbances in Nepal Threaten Rhinos: Lessons to Be
Learned,” 101.
247

Deepak Acharya, “Rhino Poaching Is a Serious Conservation Threat,” Conservation Watch-Nepal 1, no.
6 (n.d.).
248
Acharya, “Rhino Numbers Severely Depleted in Bardia”; Acharya, “Three Megafauna Died Between
Nine Days.”
249

Richard Kock, Rajan Amin, and Naresh Subedi, “Rogue Army Staff Involved in Poaching in Bardia
National Park, Nepal, 2007-2008,” Pachyderm 45 (July 2008): 116.

250

Martin and Martin, “Enhanced Community Support Reduces Rhino Poaching in Nepal,” 50–51.

251
Deepak Acharya, “Infant Rhino Poached Heinously,” Conservation Watch-Nepal 1, no. 7 (January 1,
2008).

138

Throughout 2008, twelve rhinos would eventually be lost to poaching. 252 In this
environment of sluggish public authorities and continued poaching, community members
continued to act decisively.
Near Bardia National Park, community members finally confronted poachers
directly. In the first three months of 2008, a volunteer group of community members
formed essentially a vigilante raid on poachers operating in collusion with Army
personnel. Building intelligence for two months, this group seized Level 1 and 3 poachers
along with four Army soldiers, along with weapons and rhino horn, and delivered them to
government officials in Kathmandu. 253 Subsequently, this same group arrested 17
additional Army soldiers, eventually leading to the relief of the Army commander in
Bardia. 254 Poachers conducted a final operation at Bardia in May 2008, but were
challenged by security forces, killing two guards in the process. 255 After these raids, rhino
poaching in Bardia effectively stopped. 256
Following the community raids in Bardia, Nepalese government officials in
Kathmandu began aggressively pursuing poachers. While rhino poaching continued in
Chitwan National Park, government leaders began signaling that corruption and
complicity with rhino poaching would no longer be tolerated. The Army commander at
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Bardia was relieved, and in April 2008, the government announced embezzlement
charges against the deposed king and senior leaders of the NTNC NGO for using
conservation programs to launder bribes. 257 In May 2008, the leader of Nepal’s Maoist
party declared that Nepal’s rhinos had been liberated “from the clutches of the royal
family,” and pledged to increase government security measures at parks throughout
Nepal. 258 In June 2008, an Army spokesperson admitted that over 30 Army personnel had
been caught participating in poaching, and pledged to cooperate and not interfere with the
DNPWC investigations into rhino poaching. 259 At the same time, DNPWC officials
called for shoot to kill policies to be enacted to protect rhinos, and arrested a National
Geographic journalist for alleged complicity in wildlife trafficking. 260 In November
2008, the government publicized a seizure of the royal treasury of rhino parts, include 81
rhino horns, emphasizing the Nepal government’s assumption of responsibility for the
parts. 261 This actions show public authorities beginning to respond to moral outrage and
cleansing in response to rhino poaching.
As rhino poaching continued in Chitwan National Park in 2009 and 2010, public
authorities began a series of institutional adaptions to tackle multiple levels of criminal
activity involved in rhino poaching. In June 2009, Chitwan’s chief warden declared that
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in-park security measures were insufficient to tackle the problem, and called for
expanded joint patrols and community involvement. 262 The following month, DNPWC
unveiled a plan to create District Conservation Coordination Committees comprising
leaders from park staff, the police, Army, and district forestry offices. This plan aimed to
identify poachers accessing protected areas from surrounding communities. 263
However, responses at the national level continued to lag. In May 2010, the
government released more than 100 rhino poachers only halfway through ten year terms
for poaching. 264 Throughout 2010, poaching continue at Chitwan. Anti-poaching efforts
were largely limited by jurisdiction to national parks themselves and adjacent bufferzones, frustrating efforts to tackle broader syndicates. However, by late 2010, public
authorities enacted an institutional adaption to counter the network of transnational
trafficking.
In November 2010, the Nepal government established a series of joint
interagency tasks forces to counter transnational trafficking networks. A National
Wildlife Crime Control Coordination Committee (NWCCCC) involved members from
DNPWC, the Forest Department, Customs, the Nepal Army, Nepal Police, and other
ministerial level actors, charged with establishing policy control for wildlife trafficking.
A Wildlife Crime Control Bureau (WCCB), consisting of representatives from the
aforementioned ministries plus the National Investigation Department and the Crime
262
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Investigation Bureau (CIB), enacted policies at the national level. Reporting to the
WCCB were 19 WCCB District Levels, involving officials from the same agencies
excluding the CIB. These district level bureaus coordinated interagency collaboration
countering wildlife crime including rhino poaching. 265 As a result of these changes,
public authorities began to counter wildlife-trafficking operations throughout Nepal
beyond the parks.
In 2011, the pocket of effective control that began in Bardia spread throughout
Nepal. Throughout 2011, over 250 rhino poachers were arrested across Nepal, including
50 with warrants over 10 years old. 266 More significantly, poaching effectively stopped in
Nepal in 2011. Two rhinos were poached that year; for at least one of the poached rhino,
the Level 1 and Level 2 poachers were arrested shortly thereafter. 267
This effective control of poaching continued in 2012 and beyond. During April
that year, only a single rhino was lost to poachers, who were subsequently tracked to and
extradited from India. 268 By year’s end, five of the seven trafficking syndicates known to
operate in Nepal during the crisis had been shut down. 269 Anti-poaching activities by
community members continued to grow. In January 2013, community members with a
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volunteer anti-poaching patrol arrested a Level 2 poacher near Bardia, and by 2014, over
400 community anti-poaching units were operating in Nepal. 270
Since 2011, Nepal has achieved four one-year periods of zero rhino poaching. A
gilded sign in the Nepal Army Officer’s Mess at the Chitwan National Park Headquarters
says it all: Zero-Poaching Bar. Army battalions now rotate through the park, as duty
conveys national prestige. Yet even as elite units take turns protecting rhino, community
members remain the linchpin and focus of counter-poaching operations. For instance,
family members of poachers appear in public to condemn poaching, including some who
turned in relatives to authorities. 271 The Chief Warden of Chitwan National Park
expressed his focus concisely: “anti-poaching means protecting the youth of our
community” as much as it means protecting rhinos.
Poachers remain a threat, as demonstrated by a rhino shot in August 2016.
However, even in that case, community members secured the wounded rhino before its
horn was removed, alerting public authorities in the process. 272 This failed attempt at
poaching demonstrates that rhino poaching in Nepal is now effectively controlled.

Analysis
This narrative presents evidence suggesting that social factors, particularly
pressure generated by moral outrage and cleansing, temporally preceded and led to
270
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Nepal’s effective control of poaching. As rhino poachers engaged in wildlife trafficking,
public authorities initially preferred to do little to interfere with poachers, and in some
cases collaborated with them. Only when community members began pressuring public
authorities did the trajectory of Nepal’s control of rhino poaching change. This pressure
from community members was consistent with the moral outrage and cleansing
hypothesized by the sacred value protection model.
Rhino poachers consistently poached rhinos in Nepal since the late 1980s. As
Nepal’s civil war intensified from 1995 onward, public authorities diminished protection
efforts for rhinos, demonstrating that they rationally sought to minimize expenditures for
rhino conservation, particularly given opportunity costs of security operations against
rebels. In some cases, public authorities even became complicit in poaching themselves,
underscoring their aversion to incurring costs by countering rhino poaching. Community
members in areas adjacent to protected areas engaged in governance activities and
community resource management tangentially related to rhinos.
After the global price in rhino horn began increasing in 2006, community
members began displaying moral outrage and cleansing regarding rhino poaching. In late
2006 and throughout 2007, community members began publically demonstrating against
rhino poaching, and pressuring the government to increase enforcement actions. A
pivotal moment occurred in 2008 when community members raided a poaching camp in
Bardia National Park, catching Army personnel collaborating with poachers. This action
effectively ended rhino poaching at Bardia, and triggered a cascade of government
actions nationally. Over the next two years, Army officers were relieved, security forces
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increased at parks, and anti-poaching efforts and interagency collaborations expanded
nation-wide. By 2011, rhino poaching in Nepal was effectively controlled.
This change in outcomes was consistently driven by pressure from community
members exhibiting moral outrage. Beginning with student petitions and culminating in
interagency reforms, moral outrage facilitated costly enforcement actions and
institutional adaption. As predicted by the model, community members pressured public
authorities with anger and enthusiastic support for punishing poachers as norm violators,
even going so far as to raid poacher camps and conduct volunteer anti-poaching patrols.
Community members also targeted ineffective public authorities as metanorm violators,
such as the embezzlement action against the king’s conservation NGO and the seizure of
rhino parts from the royal treasury. Throughout this period, community members
displayed moral cleansing through public statements, protests, workshops, and their
participation in rhino clubs and volunteer anti-poaching patrols.
Important shifts also occurred in state capacity and in the strategies and
preferences of public authorities. Public authorities increased the number of security
forces guarding and monitoring Nepal’s park throughout 2008 and 2009, and the 2010
interagency committees led to nation-wide enforcement efforts. This latter policy shift
was the final significant institutional change preceding the halt in poaching,
demonstrating the necessary role for public authorities in controlling poaching. However,
these changes occurred only after community members acted, and is best explained by
accounting for preferences of community members expressed through moral outrage and
cleansing. Moreover, the ongoing complicity of public authorities in poaching throughout
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2008 and 2009 demonstrates that state capacity in itself is insufficient to explain why
Nepal controlled poaching.
Likewise, the incorporation of rhino poaching into the policy agendas of the
Maoist leader and later of the Prime Minister likely influenced changes in national policy
and resource allocation. However, the exposure of the disposed king’s complicity in
conservation corruption between the Maoist party’s embrace of anti-poaching and the
shifts in national policy suggest that these changes were more than mere elite preference.
Rather, controlling rhino poaching has become a legitimizing activity for Nepal
authorities, and a relatively uncontroversial issue around which to build national unity. In
this sense, the present government’s strong commitment to continuing Nepal’s zeropoaching success demonstrates a legitimizing tradition of protecting Nepal’s rhino
extending back to the first Rana king.
The source of this legitimizing pressure was the constructed sacred value of rhino,
and not just public pressure to strengthen governance, reduce corruption, or otherwise
improve government accountability. For one, community members explicitly mobilized
on the issue of rhino conservation, whether through community anti-poaching patrols,
student rhino clubs, or lobbying for the release of jailed rhino conservation actors.
Moreover, Nepal’s improved effectiveness at controlling rhino poaching has not
coincided with broader improvements in combatting corruption or improving governance.
Throughout the crisis, Transparency International has consistently rated Nepal as one of
the world’s most corrupt countries; at the same time that Nepal effectively halted rhino
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poaching, corruption across Nepal actually worsened. 273 Similarly, Nepal’s public sector
capacity and law enforcement remain extremely weak. 274 This underscores the puzzle of
why a weak and poor country like Nepal has nevertheless effectively controlled
poaching, and speaks to the legitimizing potential of wildlife for fragile developing states.
At no point in this narrative were economic arguments for conservation
evidenced. Despite the economic logic central to the establishment of buffer zones near
Nepal’s national parks, hypothesized economic benefits from conservation never
significantly materialized for these communities. If anything, the decade-plus of civil war
preceding the mobilization of community members should have made this group less
likely to agitate for control of rhino poaching. In fact, at the start of the crisis, several
leading conservationists, including WWF-Nepal’s country representative at the time,
believed the biggest challenge facing Nepal’s rhinos was a lack of economic benefits
accruing to Nepalis from conservation. 275 Paradoxically, just as community members
raided the poachers camp near Bardia and captured complicit Army personnel,
conservationists were decrying the lack of tourist access and complete lack of funding for
buffer zones in that same area. 276 Community members proved most decisive where
economic incentives to counter poaching were most absent.
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Two further points underscore the lack of economic motivations in this narrative.
First, the government only increased park entry fees in 2012, the principle source of
conservation revenue sharing, after poaching was controlled. 277 Second, in 2009, the
government ordered all ecotourist resorts within its national parks closed, including Tiger
Tops, an iconic lodge closely associated with the creation of Chitwan National Park. 278
These lodges were the most luxurious options in Nepal’s moribund ecotourism sector,
catering almost exclusively to foreign tourists. The government’s rationale for this
decision was concessions within the park were unsound for both anti-poaching and for
ecology, though some operators claimed victimization by protectionist policies favoring
Nepali businesses over foreigner-operated and oriented hotels like Tiger Tops. In any
event, these decisions underscore the absence of material economic incentives spurring
community members in the critical actions leading to Nepal’s effective control of
poaching.

Conclusion
At a time when rhino poaching increased exponentially around the globe, and
countries with more state capacity and developed ecotourism sectors have failed to
control poaching, Nepal has emerged as an unlikely leader in successful rhino
conservation. Despite a checkered history of poaching, pronounced poverty and civil
conflict, conservation in Nepal developed deep support throughout communities living
near rhino populations, particularly in buffer zones surrounding protected areas. Shortly
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after the global price in rhino horn increased in 2006, and incidents of poaching began
rising across rhino range states, community members throughout Nepal began pressuring
public authorities to control the decades-long problem of poaching. As Nepal’s
government recovered from its civil war, moral outrage and cleansing behaviors
exhibited by community members regarding poaching were followed with a series of
institutional adaptions by public authorities. Ultimately, these measures led to near total
cessation in poaching by 2011.
The sacred value protection model best explains this shift in pressure from
community members. Amid a backdrop of civil war, as public authorities diverted
resources away from conservation and even collaborated with poachers, community
members acted. Pressuring the government to arrest poachers, dismiss charges against
guards who interdicted poachers, forming volunteer anti-poaching patrols, and even
raiding poachers camps, these community members manifested the moral outrage
predicted by the model, particularly in seeking to punish both poachers as norm violators
and the metanorm violators who support them. Moreover, community members
organized public actions through demonstrations, petitions, student groups, and
workshops—all forms of the moral cleansing that “reaffirms core values and loyalties by
acting in ways that shore up those aspects of the moral order that have been undercut by
the transgression” of poaching. 279 The embrace of this cleansing by the national
government and its security forces underscores the depth of this social influence.
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This narrative makes clear that state capacity-based explanations are insufficient
to explain Nepal’s success. Public authorities in Nepal responded to social pressure, not
vice-versa. Moreover, the complicity of such authorities in poaching during the first years
of the crisis shows that even when state capacity is lacking, conservation progress
remains possible. At the same time, both security forces to guard and monitor protected
areas and interagency cooperation to counter trafficking networks ultimately proved
necessary to control poaching.
However, economic explanations of how Nepal controlled poaching fail. The only
actors in Nepal who seemed motivated by economic incentives were poachers themselves
and public authorities who collaborated with them. Nepal’s buffer zones had never
realized the neoliberal dream of ecotourism generating economic growth, and when the
crisis began, nearly all tourist revenue streams had stopped due to the civil war. Even
now that Nepal has effectively controlled poaching, existing ecotourism capacity caters
towards accommodating Nepali visitors rather than foreigners and luxury tour operators.
This analysis is limited by scope and focus. In seeking to understand whether
social constructions of wildlife can influence conservation outcomes, I treated how
Nepalis construct rhinos as exogenous. I did not consider why most Nepalis relate to
rhinos in terms of their community rather than in economic terms, i.e. using a Communal
Sharing instead of a Market Pricing relational model. The exclusion of such questions is
justified by the limited time horizon under investigation; I assume that the predominate
social construction did not significantly change during the half-dozen years it took Nepal
to effectively control their poaching after the present crisis started. Moreover, the
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misguided yet deeply embedded bias for explaining conservation outcomes using
economic approaches justifies excluding exploration of why relational models vary. For
now, it is enough to demonstrate that they do, and that such variance matters.
My level of analysis creates a more significant limitation to my findings. In
seeking to explore national level outcomes like the control of poaching across Nepal, I
made generalizations regarding both actors and structural factors. In reality, these
categories are significantly more complex than categories like poacher, public authority,
and community member suggest. Pleading eclecticism, I sought to minimize bias in my
generalizations by anchoring my analysis in the social-ecological systems framework
developed by the Ostrom Workshop at Indiana University and the analytic narrative
methodology. 280 Still, it is possible that greater detail at the expense of generalizations
may enrich understanding of how Nepal controlled poaching. For instance, even though
few community members materially benefited directly from rhino conservation, prospect
theory would hold that individuals may have believed in future earnings potential
associated with successfully controlling poaching. Similarly, some public authorities
likely embraced institutional reforms more for political gain than for improving
conservation outcomes. Further exploration of individual motivations anchored in
historical contexts would illuminate the validity of generalizations made here.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
HOW SACRED VALUE FACILITATES THE CONTROL OF POACHING
In the present global epidemic of rhino poaching, why have only weak and poor
countries controlled rhino poaching? In the preceding chapters, I explored this puzzle to
understand why some countries are more effective than others at controlling poaching.
Rhinos are effectively controlled when individuals construct them using Communal
Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models, thus protecting them through moral
mechanisms even when state capacity and economic alternatives are lacking. This
research is both significant–– in that rhinos are critically endangered throughout the
globe— and puzzling, given dominant assumptions throughout conservation literature
and practice that privilege state capacity and economic incentives.

Literature Explaining Conservation Outcomes
Mainstream conservation literature inadequate explains the success at controlling
poaching demonstrated by countries like Nepal and Swaziland. Social scientific
explorations of conservation outcomes are a nascent field, originating only four decades
ago with the advent of the modern environmental movement. 281 The 1970s saw work in
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this field emphasized public structures to constrain individual decisions regarding
common pool resources, while the second decade emphasized varied preferences from
private interests within those structures. By the 2000s, both approaches were insufficient,
and scholars increasingly looked to communities as the focal level of analysis. 282 Recent
critical scholarship points to wildlife value orientations and social factors as potentially
significant; yet within this dimension, it is unclear what social factors matter and why. 283
Relational models theory illuminates such factors. Identifying four fundamental,
universal, and innate modes structuring interaction between individuals, this theory
postulates that individuals construct value for objects depending on the relational mode
with which they associate that object. 284 When individuals associate an object with a
Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching relationship, the object
attains incomparable or sacred value. Conversely, when individuals associate an object
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with a Market Pricing relationship, the object possesses fungible or secular value. The
type of value an individual associates with an object determines how that individual
responds to proposed trade-offs regarding that object.
The Sacred Value Protection Model identifies three forms of trade-off
reasoning. 285 In routine trade-offs, individuals compare two objects of fungible or secular
value. In essence, this assigns a price to an object. In tragic trade-offs, individuals
compare two incomparable or sacred objects, such as weighing the life of a mother
against that of a child during a difficult pregnancy. Such situations where significant loss
is unavoidable define tragedies.
Taboo trade-offs are the third form of trade-off reasoning, where an individual
compares an object with fungible or secular value to an object with incomparable or
sacred value. Such situations threaten the social relationship associated with the sacred
object, eliciting cognitive, emotional, and affective behaviors from individuals who
contemplate the taboo trade-off, specifically moral outrage and moral cleansing.
Moral outrage refers to actions by an individual seeking to punish both the norm
violator who proposes the taboo trade-off and a metanorm violator who approves of the
taboo trade-off. An example of moral outrage is pressuring an authority to harshly punish
a poacher, or seeking to inform on or punish a poacher oneself.
Moral cleansing refers to symbolic actions by an individual to outwardly
disassociate oneself with the taboo trade-off. An example of moral cleansing is joining a
285
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protest or advocacy group, making public statements against poaching, or disavowing
previous participation in poaching. Out, damned spot! Out, I say! 286
If individuals living near endangered wildlife construct such species with nonMarket Priced relational models, then poaching of those species becomes a taboo tradeoff, eliciting moral outrage and cleansing that can facilitate effective control of poaching.
To assess this hypothesis, this research first sought to understand where rhino
poaching has been effectively controlled by cataloging rhino poaching events around the
world by country. Next, to assess whether relational models correlate with the effective
control of poaching, I utilized formal institutional rules as proxy measures for
predominate relational models. After establishing that such a correlation exists, I then
sought to understand whether the relational models manifested by individuals correspond
with that suggested by formal institutional rules in three cases. I selected three cases
whose formal institutional rules suggested ideal type variance of relational models,
namely Communal Sharing in Nepal, Authority Ranking in Swaziland, and Market
Pricing in South Africa. After finding that individuals within these cases employed
relational models consistent with the relational model suggested by formal institutional
rules, I then investigated the case of Nepal to understand how moral outrage and
cleansing mechanisms facilitated the effective control of poaching. I did so by assessing
an analytic narrative of Nepal’s successful control of poaching after the 2006 crisis.
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Findings
The Control of Rhino Poaching
In Chapter 3, I explored the relationship between the control of poaching and
formal institutional rules associated with certain relational models. Drawing from
literature on social control, criminology, and common pool resource management, I
operationally define poaching as controlled when the illegal harvesting of rhino is rare,
punished, and does not threaten a population with extirpation.287
Since 2006, rhino poaching has been effectively controlled in five rhino range
states: Botswana, Nepal, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia.
Poaching has not been controlled in the Democratic Republic of Congo, India,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe; rhino
have been extirpated in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2010, in Malaysia in 2011,
in Mozambique in 2013, and in Vietnam in 2010.
In Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda, poaching may have been controlled; however,
I exclude these from my analysis because it is unclear whether poaching is controlled
there or simple absent. While the absence of poaching is beneficial for conservation, it is
not the same as effectively controlling poaching. It is hypothetically possible that
transnational criminal organizations engaged in rhino poaching have simply not
attempted to operate within these countries. While such an agential decision merits
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further inquiry, it lies beyond the scope of this research into whether social constructions
of rhino significantly vary.

Relational Models and the Control of Poaching
Of the universe of countries with wild rhino populations, all five countries with
formal institutional rules for rhino conservation consistent with Communal Sharing or
Authority Ranking relational models effectively controlled poaching.
Conversely, nine countries with formal institutional rules for rhino conservation
associated with the Market Pricing relational model did not effectively control poaching;
in four of these, rhino were extirpated.
There was no relationship between state capacity indicators or economic
incentives and the control or lack of control of poaching, except that states with the
largest capacity and ecotourism sectors also experienced the most intense poaching.

Manifestations of Relational Models in Individual
In Chapter 4, I explored whether formal institutional rules accurately reflect actual
relational models used by individuals within a country.
Focusing on three countries whose institutional rules suggested ideal type
variance among relational models, I found that a significant majority of rhino
conservationists in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa employed a single relational
model, and that model was consistent with the formal institutional rules in that country
for rhino conservation. In Nepal, this predominant model was Communal Sharing (n= 31
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of 35). In Swaziland, the predominant model was Authority Ranking (n=18 of 24). In
South Africa, the predominant model was Market Pricing (n=28 of 32).

Moral Mechanisms in Nepal’s Control of Poaching
In Chapter 5, I investigated whether the moral outrage and moral cleansing
mechanisms predicted by the Sacred Value Protection Model facilitated Nepal's effective
control of poaching.
Through an analytic narrative, I established that moral outrage and cleansing were
the key mechanisms generating community pressure on public authorities to control
poaching. This community pressure occurred despite a lack of material economic
incentives, and countered state capacity that was at best ambivalent to and occasionally
even complicit in rhino poaching. This moral outrage and cleansing was critical in
facilitating Nepal's effective response to poaching and emergence as the world's most
successful country in controlling rhino poaching.

Summary
These findings collectively establish that relational models are a critical variable
in explaining the effective control of rhino poaching. Since the 2006 global epidemic in
rhino poaching began, only countries where non-Market Priced relational models
predominate have effectively controlled poaching. In these countries, most individuals
construct rhinos either as something they hold in common or in relation to a hierarchical
authority. Rhino poaching then becomes a taboo trade-off, eliciting moral outrage and
cleansing that pressures public authorities to adapt to poaching operations and effectively
158

control poaching. This moral outrage and cleansing can occur despite weak state capacity
and in the absence of economic incentives to control poaching. Paradoxically, such
economic incentives might be incompatible with these moral mechanisms, and mute any
outrage or cleansing poaching might otherwise elicit.

Limitations
This research is chiefly limited in its scope and level of analysis. First, this
research has examined whether social constructions of rhino vary, and if any such
variance matters. This focus is significant, as conventional discourses on conservation
uncritically embed assumptions about state capacity and especially economic incentives.
For example, during a recent contested debate over legalization of rhino horn trade at the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species’ 17th Conference of Parties,
one legalization advocate exclaimed "conservation that doesn't generate profits is merely
conversation!" This research has critically examined such perspectives, demonstrating
that constructing wildlife as a commodity (i.e. relating to it with a Market Pricing
relational schemata) is a choice some actors make while other actors do not. Those who
do not construct rhino as commodities are more effective at controlling rhino poaching in
the current crisis.
Yet in seeking to demonstrate that social constructions of rhino can vary in a
significant way, I have not explored why such constructions vary. What causes
individuals to use one relational model versus another? Under the pressures of a taboo
trade-off, what is the durability of a non-Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking
relational model? In other words, how long will moral outrage and cleansing last?
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Experimental research in trade-off reasoning suggests that these effects mute in the
presence of confusing framing, and potentially with time. 288 What is the instrumental
purpose of ascribing incomparable value to an object? 289 How do relational models
change and evolve? 290 Having established that sacred values matter, future research
should explore the causes and dynamics of changes of such values and relational models.
Moreover, I do not claim that the institutional trajectory of Nepal nor relational
models themselves offer panaceas to the contemporary challenge of poaching, rhino or
otherwise. Mindful of Ostrom and Cox's injunction to avoid such panaceas while moving
towards a diagnostic approach in understanding social-ecological systems, this bears
underscoring. 291 Just as rhino present unique conservation challenges distinct from those
posed by other endangered species, each country and indeed each community engaging in
resource management is distinct from others. Rhino are not elephants, and Nepal is not
South Africa.
However, even as we should not conflate distinct cases into one universal
template for conservation, neither should we assume no parallel generalities exist
between cases. My analysis of institutional rules and relational models research conforms
to Levin’s call for searching for patterns across cases, and my analytic narrative to
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George and Bennett’s for typological theorizing. 292 An essential task for scientific
research is to explore what is distinguishable from what is common across varied cases.
This research suggests that relational models are one such distinguishable commonality.
A second limitation lies in this project's level of analysis and generalizability. I
have focused on outcomes at the national level, moving through explanatory variables
from the national level through the community to the individual. In doing so, I have
conflated action situations while assuming holons, nested subassemblies of part-whole
units in complex adaptive systems. 293
In reality, there may be systematic effects and connections between these levels
that this research did not consider. For instance, my analysis of state capacity privileged
instrumental uses of that capacity. Given the inescapable politics of wildlife policy
outcomes, it is both possible and likely that public authorities responded to public
pressure to control poaching for political purposes beyond the efficacy of addressing
poaching. 294 From this, it is likely that the politics of rhino poaching policy contributed to
successful adaptions to the contemporary crisis, such as the embrace of anti-poaching by
Nepal's Maoist leader. While this research’s focus on varying social constructions has
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identified a source of political pressure for that political decision, I have not fully
explored the politics of that decision itself. This question bears further research.
Similarly, I operationalized actors for rhino social-ecological systems as
belonging to three categories: poachers, public authorities, and community members.
This generalization is consistent with the framework approached advocated by Ostrom
and others. 295 However, such generalization may miss important variation among actors
within these groups, such as that between a national park official and an Army soldier
within the broad category of public authority, or among different levels of poachers. This
potential variation could also be explored in further detail to assess its significance.
Against such limitations, I plead theoretical eclecticism in pursuit of
understanding why weak and poor states have controlled poaching, and investigating
whether social constructions can matter. This type of “methodological ‘bet’ about which
unit of aggregation will produce tractable and empirically powerful explanations” is
justified both by its attention to micro-foundations of actors, and I hope by its findings. 296
However, future research should explore variance among levels of analysis and within
categories of actors.
A deeper challenge to these findings lies in my privileging material interests in
appraising economic incentives. For instance, following prospect theory, it is possible
that individuals who did not materially benefit from ecotourism nonetheless believed that
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if rhino poaching were controlled, such benefits would materialize in the future. Against
that critique, I note that such benefits have still not yet materialized in countries like
Nepal, and that individual statements and behaviors I observed did not suggest that
individuals are motivated by economic gains. Nevertheless, given the centrality of utility
maximization in conservation discourses and the challenge my research poses to that
economic approach, this potential critique should be further explored through prospect
theory.

Theoretical Implications
This research has implications for the theoretical employment of relational models
and the diagnostic approach to explaining conservation outcomes, and suggests an
institutional sequence of endangered species protection.

Relational Models Theory and Sacred Value Protection
First, this research has demonstrated the utility of relational models theory and the
sacred value protection model in explaining conservation outcomes. Contemporary
research in wildlife policy points towards psychological variance in wildlife value
orientations, 297 social capital, 298 and institutionalized norms 299 as key explanatory factors
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in understanding outcomes regarding wildlife policy and common pool resource
management. This research suggests that the relational schemata identified in relational
models theory are important variables previous studies pointed towards.

Social-Ecological Systems Framework
Similarly, these findings lend credence to the utility of Ostrom's diagnostic
framework for understanding social-ecological systems. This approach enabled crosscase comparison and analysis of a variety of cases involving rhino conservation. Ostrom
and McGinnis (2014) argued that this approach could enable scholars and practitioners to
compare diverse cases by focusing on a key level of analysis, identifying which variables
at that level can be observed and measured, and communicating the results of such
variables across research communities. 300 My research fruitfully followed that approach,
focusing on the interactions between poachers, public authorities, and community
members, particularly the relational models employed in those interactions. These
findings are relevant not only to political and social scientists, but also to scholars and
practitioners from the wide range of disciplines engaged in conservation. As such, this
demonstrates the value of the social-ecological system framework approach and its
potential for further illuminating wildlife policy and conservation outcomes.
An Institutional Sequence for Endangered Species Protection?
From that perspective of institutional analysis, it appears that successful
conservation of endangered species may follow an institutional sequence. In Nepal,
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effective control of poaching began with a critical juncture, at the point where
populations of the endangered species fell to an alarming level. This occurred around
1973, after the lifting of royal protections from rhino habitat joined with increased human
population pressure on rhino populations following DEET-induced malarial eradication.
At this critical juncture, a public authority established a physical boundary
separating the endangered species from human populations, and assigned guards and
monitors to enforce that boundary and generate information about the species. In Nepal,
this occurred when the government established the Chitwan National Park as a protected
area, and assigned the Nepalese Army to guard the park. Meanwhile, Forestry
Department officials monitored populations in conjunction with both international NGOs
(WWF-Nepal) and domestic NGOs (the KMTNC).
Next, community members were re-socialized to interact with the endangered
species in a non-exploitative way. In Nepal, this occurred through the creation of the
national park buffer zone community forests. Significantly, these community members
were allowed to harvest grass and other forest products from rhino habitats, but not to
profit from rhinos themselves. Ecotourism drawing foreign tourist receipts and revenue
was pitched by international conservationists but never materialized in reality; even
today, Nepal’s ecotourism sector today remains a world apart from thriving ecotourism
sectors across sub-Saharan Africa and even neighboring India. In this manner,
community members became socialized to construct the endangered species with their
community, forming Communal Sharing relational models.
Echoing Marx’s concept of a metabolic rift, it may be that when unsustainable
extraction of a resource threatens a species with extirpation or extinction, the key to
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averting that outcome is restoration of a species' social and ecological ties to the
community members who live near it, and the public authorities who guard and monitor
it. This metabolic restoration socially restores the exploited wildlife from alienation to an
ecological metabolism. 301 Social welfare studies identify that de-commodification occurs
when a service formerly constructed as a commodity becomes a matter of right, severing
its existence from a market. 302 Nepal’s rhinos may demonstrate the potential of species
de-commodification as a means of protection against surging illicit demand in wildlife
trafficking.
These moral mechanisms proved critical to Nepal's effective control of rhino
poaching despite the fantastically lucrative price commanded by rhino horn after 2006
and the absence of effective state capacity after Nepal's civil war. Further research into
protection of endangered species should compare this institutional sequence to path
trajectories in other cases where communities have attempted to conserve endangered
flora and fauna.

The Price of Rhino Horn and the Evolution of Relational Models
Finally, more research is needed into understanding two factors outside the scope
of these findings. First, further study should be conducted into why the global price of
rhino horn increased as it did in 2006. Based on extent literature on the crisis, this study
assumed that this price shift occurred exogenously due to a market manipulation by
301
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syndicates trafficking rhino horn to emerging markets in East Asia, namely Vietnam and
China. However, this event is prone to facile explanations and inferences derived thereof.
Many assume that rhino horn is a normal good, and that demand pressures driving
current poaching can be reduced by simple measures such as creating a legal trade for
horn, farmed or otherwise, 303 or synthetically creating a substitute good. 304 However,
rhino horn is in fact more properly considered a Veblen good, whose demand is
proportional to and a function of its high price. This concept was first identified in the
late 19th century as part of the conspicuous consumption of industrialization's nouveau
riche. 305 In today's demand for rhino horn, it appears this phenomenon now occurs in
contemporary East Asia. Further economic research should explore market dynamics of
such Veblen goods, particularly as they involve illicit markets and transnational criminal
organizations.
Similarly, having established what relational models can cause in relation to
conservation outcomes, further research should explore what causes relational models.
Why do relational models vary? How do relational models change? When engaged in
taboo trade-off reasoning, how long a non-Market Priced relational model endure?
Relational model theorists have identified relational model evolution as a future direction
for research, exploring why and how some objects attain incomparable value while others
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do not. 306 Synthesizing these questions with political science research into varying social
constructions of wildlife and privatization in governance could generate novel insights
into why relational models change. 307

Policy Implications
This research demonstrates that how we think about endangered wildlife matters.
This holds practical implications for the immediate challenge of rhino conservation and
the protection of other endangered species, and for broader issues of state-building,
ecotourism, and countering illicit trafficking.
For rhino conservation, these findings suggest that the path toward successful
conservation and the control of rhino poaching lies in socializing community members to
value rhinos as communal responsibilities, rather than in a militarized focus on increasing
state coercive capacity or through economic incentives like ecotourism. While state
capacity remains a necessary element of effective control of poaching, it is no substitute
for price-shock resistant moral mechanisms built on de-commodified community
relationships. The recent success of community-centered anti-poaching efforts in South
Africa such as the Black Mambas underscores the external validity of such
mechanisms. 308
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Similarly, these findings suggest that efforts to protect rhinos and endangered
species through economic incentives like ecotourism are problematic. Given the
fantastically lucrative profit potential for a single act of poaching, promoting sustainable
alternative uses of rhino and similar endangered species are at best ineffective. At worst,
such measures may exacerbate the very poaching they seek to address by legitimizing the
economic exploitation and commodification of wildlife like rhino, and socializing
community members and public authorities alike to see such wildlife through Market
Pricing relational schemata, thereby suppressing moral mechanisms that could contribute
to endangered species protection.
Similarly, current public discourses about economic solutions to rhino poaching
are likewise at best ineffective, and may in fact contribute to increased poaching.
Legalizing trade in rhino horn, promoting the agricultural farming of rhino for ecotourism
game parks, and auctioning hunting permits for rhino to the highest tourist bidder likely
legitimizes the construction of rhinos as commodities and encourages individuals to
reference rhinos using the Market Priced relational model. Regardless of any short term
gains in revenue generated for endangered species protection and conservation, such
economic solutions may ultimately prove counterproductive by dampening the only
demonstrated mechanism for effectively controlling rhino poaching in the current crisis.
In the end, it matters how we think about endangered species like rhino. When we
construct rhino as commodities, we relate to them through a Market Pricing relational
model. Under such circumstances and discourse, whether a poacher successfully kills a
rhino becomes a function of the profit potential for that poacher and the capacity of
public authorities. To effectively control poaching under this Market Priced
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circumstance, either the price of rhino horn must decrease or the socioeconomic status of
that poacher must increase until such poaching becomes irrational.
Alternatively, increasing the capacity of the public authorities relative to rhinos
could increase to the point where guards could guarantee the rhino’s security. However,
Kenya's example regarding state capacity is instructive. There, the last three northern
white rhino in existence are continuously guarded by rangers at arms’ distance,
suggesting that while a concentration of public authorities around rhino is possible, it can
only exist with populations teetering on the brink of extinction. At the same time, the
intensely militarized intensive protection zone of South Africa’s Kruger National Park
continues to lose rhino to poachers at an alarming rate. During 2015, this area was losing
approximately three rhinos per day, demonstrating that not even green militarization is
enough to controlling poaching.
Yet countries like Nepal show that an alternative outcome is possible. When we
think about endangered species like rhino in reference to our community or to a common
hierarchical authority— when we use Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational
models to construct rhino— poaching becomes a threat not only to wildlife but to our
relationships with a community. This elicits moral responses— outrage and cleansing—
that block cost-benefit calculations of profit potential and pressure public authorities to
guard, monitor, and sanction poachers.
The essence of these moral mechanisms is for a community member to see in the
rhino him or herself, and to associate rhino with his or her relationship to the community.
During fieldwork for this dissertation, Nepali respondents repeatedly responded to the
question, "Are rhinos important to you?" by exclaiming, "I am Nepali!" Many continued
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speaking of personal encounters with rhino. One flatly told me, "rhinos are safe here,"
while another teenager took me into his community forest to proudly show me his
community’s resident rhino, living openly without a guard or a fence in sight. These
respondents overwhelming described Nepal’s rhino as fellow members of their
community, for whom they felt moral responsibility.
Ultimately, the responsibility one feels for wildlife protection is a function of how
one values it. In his essay “Money Versus Goods,” the poet and conservationist Wendell
Berry observed that:
A proper economy, moreover, would designate certain things as priceless. This
would not be, as now, the “priceless” of things that are extremely rare or expensive, but
would refer to things of absolute value, beyond and above any price that could be set
upon them by any market. The things of absolute value would be fertile land, clean water
and air, ecological health, and the capacity of nature to renew herself in the economic
landscape. . . . there are precedents in all societies and traditions that have understood the
land or the world as sacred—or, speaking practically, as possessing a suprahuman value.
The rule of pricelessness clearly imposes certain limits upon the idea of land ownership.
Owners would enjoy certain customary privileges, necessarily, as the land would be
entrusted to their intelligence and responsibility. But they would be expected to use the
land as its servants and on behalf of all the living. 309

From this perspective, if we designate certain wildlife like rhino beyond and
above any price set upon them by a market, we simultaneously constrain our choices of
actions regarding such wildlife and create positive moral obligations to act toward that
wildlife in a public trust.
This research supports that view. In today's crisis of rhino poaching, the only
effective control of poaching occurs where community members construct rhino as
elements of that community, to be defended against profit seeking poachers and despite
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resource constrained authorities. In a globalized market where rhino horn costs more than
cocaine and gold, and rhino exist only in remote environments guarded by authorities of
limited capacity, de-commodification and the morality of community members may be
wild rhino's only hope.
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APPENDIX
Interview Questionnaire
Project Synopsis
This project explores how various communities manage rhino conservation and rhino poaching,
and assesses factors that impact the control of poaching. In particular, field research is being
conducted to assess rules, norms, and shared strategies vary in different locales, and how factors
affect responses to poaching.

Research Questions
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

What is the social construction of a rhino in a given locale?
What is the dominant relational model used to construct rhinos in a locale?
What are the institutional characteristics of communities that control rhino poaching?
How do conservation organizations manage the threat of poaching?
What lessons have been learned from the various ways in conservationists have sought to
protect rhinos?

Research Participants: Government officials involved in rhino conservation, professional
conservation practitioners; local scholars and analysts; international conservation specialists, local
conservation leaders and participants.
Assessment: In order to assess and compare various episodes of rhino poaching, I will interview
government officials, conservation actors, and local participants and experts regarding their roles,
insights, and perceptions of rhinos and efforts to conserve rhinos and counter rhino poaching.

Interview Questions
Introduction and Context Assessment
1. Tell me a bit about your own professional pathway, and in particular what drew you
personally to become involved in rhino conservation? (e.g., How did you come to work in your
current occupation? Or, what is your relationship to the conflict episode under consideration?)
2. What do you do in relation to rhino conservation?
3. What are the present opportunities for, and challenges, to rhino conservation in [location]?
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Social Construction and Relational Model to Rhinos
4. What do you think should happen to rhinos?
5. Is it important to conserve rhinos? If so, why?
6. Why are rhinos important in [ place]?
7. How should rhinos be treated by society?
8. Are there other things that are equivalent to rhinos? If so, what?
9. Who is responsible for rhinos?
10. Where do rhinos live? Who does that land belong to?
11. Who should make decisions about rhinos?
12. What groups are involved with rhinos?
13. What is happening to rhinos? Why do you think that is happening?

Institutions Regarding Rhinos
14. What are rules associated with rhinos in your country?
15. Is there a boundary around rhinos?
16. Who guards rhinos?
17. Is hunting a rhino legal? Is it ok?
18. Can you legally own a rhino? Should you?
19. What do you think about poaching?
20. What is the penalty for poaching a rhino? What do you think the penalty should be?

Historical Experiences with Poaching
21. When have rhinos been poached in your country? What happened?
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22. Was there a response to the poaching? What do you think should have happened?
23. What do you think prevents poaching?
24. What do you think should be done about rhinos in your country?

Assessment of Rhino Conservation
25. What is your view of the role that conservation actors have played in supporting rhino
conservation in [insert location]? When did your organization start working in this region? Has it
received support from the state or international donors?
26. What is the approach of the rhino conservation policy as it relates to controlling poaching?
How does the conservation program aim to achieve its stated goals?
27. What were the principal challenges in terms of the design, organization, or implementation of
the rhino conservation in [insert location]? What constraints does your organization face in
implementing its projects and programs (e.g., economic, political, temporal, normative)?
28. In your view, how important has your organization’s programming been for helping to
improve conservation and this community?
29. In what ways has conservation programming protected rhinos? What are various metrics of
success (e.g., decreased poaching rates, more arrests, less attempts etc.)?
30. What are your reflections on the scale and scope of the efforts in terms of its overall
contribution to rhino conservation?
31. What are the principal lessons learned for rhino conservation (e.g., what works or does not
work)? In your view, what could conservation organizations do differently to have a greater
positive impact on preventing rhino poaching in this community?
32. Is there anything else that I haven’t covered here that you would like to share?
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